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1 Introduction
Several cartels involving newspaper publishers have been uncovered all around the world.
In 1969, a U.S. District Court convicted of monopolization the two daily newspapers of
general circulation in Tucson, Arizona, for jointly setting subscription and advertising
rates.1 In 1996, several Venezuelan newspapers were convicted of forming a cartel to
fix advertising rates for movie theaters.2 In 2005, the Brazilian antitrust authority fined
the four largest newspapers in Rio de Janeiro for forming a cartel, after a simultaneous
increase in cover prices by 20%.3 In 2010, the Croatian antitrust authority established
that nine publishers of daily newspapers engaged in concerted practices that translated
into a uniform increase in newspapers’ cover prices.4 In 2014, the Hungarian antitrust
authority convicted the four major newspaper publishers in the country of price-fixing
conspiracy.5 Also in 2014, the Montenegrin antitrust authority convicted the three major
daily newspaper publishers in the country for price-fixing conspiracy.6
Newspapers are two-sided platforms that enable the interaction between two distinct
types of agents: advertisers and readers. As pointed out by Evans and Schmalensee (2013,
p. 2), “a number of results for single-sided firms, which are the focus of much of the applied
antitrust economics literature, do not apply directly to multi-sided platforms.” However,
the theoretical literature on collusion in two-sided markets is remarkably scarce, which is
striking given the empirical evidence on collusion in these markets.7 In particular, our
understanding of imperfect collusion among two-sided platforms, i.e., collusion that does
not yield the monopoly outcome, is very limited.
In this paper, we study the price and welfare effects of collusion between two horizontally
differentiated platforms, allowing for any degree of collusion. Our baseline model is an
infinitely repeated version of the canonical Armstrong (2006)’s model, with single-homing
on both sides and either positive or negative cross-group externalities. We first consider the
scenario in which platforms engage in two-sided collusion, that is, collusion on the prices
set on both sides of the market. We show that the most profitable collusive agreement
involves a price structure that minimizes the platforms’ incentives to deviate from the
1Citizen Publishing Co. v. United States 394 U.S. 131 (1969).
2See page 9 of the 2005 report by the Venezuelan antitrust authority available at: http://www.oecd.
org/daf/competition/prosecutionandlawenforcement/38835563.pdf.
3CADE - Processo Administrativo no. 08012.002097/99-81.
4CCA vs. daily newspaper publishers: UP/I 030-02/2008-01/072.
5Gazdasa´gi Versenyhivatal (GVH) - Case Number: Vj/23/2011.
6Agency for Protection of Competition - Case Number: 02-UPI-68/1-14. In this case, there was even
a written agreement signed by three of the convicted publishers, where they combined to simultaneously
increase the retail price of newspapers.
7For other examples of collusion in two-sided markets, see Ruhmer (2011) and Dewenter et al. (2011).
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agreement. Using this result, we show that (optimal) collusion distorts the price structure
(relative to the static Nash equilibrium) by leading to more rent extraction from the side
in which the degree of differentiation is higher. We also establish that two-sided collusion
may either lead to higher prices on both sides of the market or to lower prices on one side
of the market (the one with the lower degree of differentiation) and higher prices on the
other side of the market. The latter scenario occurs when the degree of differentiation on
one of the sides is sufficiently low (relative to cross-group externalities) and the discount
factor is not too large.
We then consider the scenario in which platforms engage in one-sided collusion, i.e.,
they set their prices cooperatively on one side of the market and non-cooperatively on the
other side. Such a collusive behavior can be explained by the existence of coordination or
antitrust costs that make it optimal for platforms to collude on a single side of the market,
and has been documented empirically in the case of newspapers. For instance, using data
from the Italian daily newspaper market from 1976 to 2003, Argentesi and Filistrucchi
(2007) found empirical evidence that the four biggest newspapers colluded on cover prices,
but found no evidence for collusion on advertising rates.
One-sided collusive agreements affect the prices on the non-cooperative side of the
market because of the existence of cross-group externalities. If increasing the price on the
collusive side softens competition on the non-cooperative side, the most profitable one-
sided collusive agreement leads to supra-competitive prices on both sides of the market.
This happens when the cross-group externalities exerted on the collusive side are negative.
By contrast, if increasing the price on the collusive side strengthens competition on the
non-cooperative side, the price on one of the two sides will be above its static Nash level,
while the price on the other side will be below its static Nash level. This scenario occurs
when the cross-group externalities exerted on the collusive side are positive. Interestingly,
if these externalities are sufficiently high (relative to the degree of differentiation on the
collusive side), the price on the collusive side is below its static Nash level, while the price
on the non-cooperative side is above its static Nash level. As a result, one-sided collusion
may benefit the users on the collusive side and harm the users on the non-cooperative side.
Next, we extend our analysis to a setting in which there is single-homing on one side of
the market and multi-homing on the other side. A key difference between this extension
and the baseline model (under the full market coverage scenario) is that total demand on
the multi-homing side increases (resp. decreases) when prices on the multi-homing side
increase (resp. decrease). Therefore, collusion in that setting can affect total welfare while
it does not in our baseline model. We first show that two-sided collusion has no impact
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on the price on the multi-homing side but leads to a price increase on the single-homing
side. Consequently, users on the multi-homing side and total welfare are not affected while
users on the single-homing side are harmed. Turning to one-sided collusion we show that,
as in the baseline model, collusion on a single side leads to a decrease in the price on that
side and an increase in the price on the other side if the network externalities received by
the collusive side are positive and large enough. We further establish that when collusion
occurs on the single-homing (resp. multi-homing) side only, it raises total welfare if and
only if the cross-group externalities received by the collusive side are strong enough (resp.
positive and small enough).
Related literature. Ruhmer (2011) is the closest paper to ours. She also considers
a repeated version of Armstrong’s model but her setting is substantially less general than
ours. First, in the context of two-sided collusion, she focuses on perfect collusion (i.e., collu-
sion at the monopoly prices) while we allow for imperfect collusion as well. This is natural
when platforms are differentiated: in this case, perfect collusion may not be sustainable
while (profitable) collusion at other prices could be. The distinction between perfect and
imperfect two-sided collusion turns out to be crucial: a focus on perfect collusion leads to
the prediction that prices always increase if platforms collude on both sides of the market,
while this is not always true under imperfect collusion. Second, in the context of one-sided
collusion, Ruhmer (2011) focuses on the profitability and sustainability of a very specific
collusive agreement in which platforms set the price on the collusive side at the maximum
level that allows them to fully cover that side of the market (which is above the static
Nash level). In contrast, we do not restrict the type of one-sided collusive agreements that
platforms can achieve and show that they may find it optimal to decrease the price on the
collusive side below its static Nash level. This explains, in particular, why one-sided col-
lusion may be unprofitable in Ruhmer’s setting, while this is never the case in our setting.
Finally, we examine both the scenario in which there is single-homing on both sides and
a competitive bottleneck scenario with multi-homing on a single side, while Ruhmer only
deals with the former. Our analysis of the case where users on one side are allowed to
multi-home brings additional insights as it allows us to have a demand expansion effect on
the multi-homing side.
Our paper is also related to the work of Dewenter et al. (2011) who build a model to
investigate the welfare effects of collusion between newspaper publishers. They consider a
static setting where newspapers compete in prices in the reader market and in quantities in
the advertising market, and compare the platforms’ profits when there is two-sided perfect
collusion, one-sided perfect collusion (on the advertising side) and two-sided competition.
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In contrast, we investigate, in a dynamic setting, the most profitable sustainable agreement,
allowing for intermediate degrees of collusion and analyzing the incentives for platforms to
comply with the collusive agreement. Dewenter et al. (2011) find that, when newspapers
only collude on the advertisers’ side, the price is lower on the non-cooperative side while
it is higher on the collusive side (as compared to the static Nash prices). By contrast, we
show that one-sided collusion may also lead to a price lower than the competitive price on
the collusive side.8
Another paper our work is related to is Boffa and Filistrucchi (2014). These authors
build a model of collusion between two TV channels and use it to show that prices above
the two-sided monopoly price may prevail on one side of the market as a means to enhance
cartel sustainability. However, they assume that the price on the viewer side is zero and
study collusion in quantities, which makes their paper complementary to ours. Moreover,
they focus on the case of two-sided collusion while we also deal with one-sided collusion.
There is also a small literature on collusion with network externalities in one-sided
markets. Pal and Scrimitore (2016) show that the relationship between market concentra-
tion and collusion sustainability depends on the strength of network externalities. In the
same vein, Song and Wang (2017) show that the presence of strong network externalities
can reverse the traditional result that collusion between firms is easier with differentiated
products (Deneckere, 1983). Finally, Rasch (2017) studies the relationship between firms’
incentives to introduce compatibility and collusion and finds that it is non-monotonic.
Finally, our paper is also linked to the work by Choi and Gerlach (2013) on competing
firms’ incentives to collude when they interact in multiple markets and demands in these
markets are interrelated. The main goal of Choi and Gerlach (2013) is, however, funda-
mentally different from ours. They focus their analysis on antitrust enforcement issues
and, in particular, on whether the discovery of a cartel in one market favors the emer-
gence or collapse of a cartel in another market. Moreover, they restrict their attention to
homogeneous goods, which implies in particular that collusion at the monopoly price is
sustainable whenever some collusion is sustainable. In contrast, we consider a setting with
differentiated platforms and possibly imperfect collusion, and abstract away from antitrust
enforcement issues.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we investigate the price
8In both papers, the users on the collusive side may benefit from a one-sided collusive agreement, but
the mechanisms driving this result in the two papers are different. In Dewenter et al. (2011), this result
may hold despite the price increase on the collusive side because of an indirect feedback effect: the price
decrease on the non-cooperative side leads to more participation on that side, which benefits the users on
the collusive side. In contrast, in our baseline model, the result that one-sided collusion may benefit the
users on the collusive side is driven by the direct impact on the price paid by these users.
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and welfare effects of two-sided and one-sided collusion in a setting with single-homing on
both sides of the market. In Section 3, we extend our analysis to the scenario in which
there is single-homing on one side of the market and (partial) multi-homing on the other
side of the market. We discuss some of our assumptions and derive the policy implications
of our findings in Section 4. Finally, we conclude in Section 5. Most of the proofs are
relegated to the Appendix.
2 Baseline model: Single-homing on both sides
We consider an infinitely repeated version of Armstrong’s (2006) model with single-homing
on both sides of the market. There are two platforms in the market, A and B, that enable
the interaction between two groups of users, 1 and 2. Users on each side are uniformly
distributed along the interval [0, 1] and platforms are located at the extremes: xA = 0 and
xB = 1. Platform i ∈ {A,B} sets a subscription fee pij to the users on each side of the
market j ∈ {1, 2}. There is single-homing on both sides of the market and the utility of
an agent on side j located at x ∈ [0, 1] that joins platform i is:
uij(x, p
i
1, p
i
2, p
−i
1 , p
−i
2 ) = kj + αjn
i
−j(p
i
1, p
i
2, p
−i
1 , p
−i
2 )− tj
∣∣xi − x∣∣− pij, (1)
where: kj is the intrinsic benefit that an agent on side j gets from joining a platform; αj
captures the benefit (which can be positive or negative) that an agent on side j enjoys from
the existence of an agent on the other side of the market that joined the same platform;
and tj > 0 measures the degree of differentiation between platforms on side j.
The demand addressed to platform i on side j is:9
nij(p
i
1, p
i
2, p
−i
1 , p
−i
2 ) =
1
2
+
αj(p
−i
−j − pi−j) + t−j(p−ij − pij)
2(t1t2 − α1α2) . (2)
Platforms interact for an infinite number of periods and have a common discount factor
δ ∈ (0, 1). In each period, τ ∈ {0, 1, 2...}, they simultaneously set membership fees, pij.
Platforms have constant marginal production costs, which, for simplicity, are normalized
to zero. Thus, the per-period profit function of platform i ∈ {A,B} is:
pii(pi1, p
i
2, p
−i
1 , p
−i
2 ) = p
i
1n
i
1(p
i
1, p
i
2, p
−i
1 , p
−i
2 ) + p
i
2n
i
2(p
i
1, p
i
2, p
−i
1 , p
−i
2 ). (3)
9For details, see Armstrong (2006). Under full market coverage, the demands addressed to the two
platforms on side j ∈ {1, 2} are related in the following way: nij = 1− n−ij , for i ∈ {A,B}.
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Assumption 1
i. 4t1t2 > (α1 + α2)
2.
ii. k1 >
3t1−α1−2α2
2
and k2 >
3t2−2α1−α2
2
.
Assumption 1 ensures that the static game has a unique (symmetric) Nash equilibrium
with full coverage of both sides of the market (Armstrong, 2006).10
Let us first recall the Nash equilibrium of the stage game.
Lemma 1 (Armstrong, 2006) If platforms set prices non-cooperatively, they choose
equal prices, pNj = tj−α−j for j ∈ {1, 2}, fully cover both market sides, and get equal market
shares on each side of the market. Their individual profit is given by piN = t1+t2−α1−α2
2
.
Proof. See Armstrong (2006) for the determination of the Nash prices and profits. Market
j ∈ {1, 2} is fully covered if and only if uij
(
1
2
, pN1 , p
N
2 , p
N
1 , p
N
2
) ≥ 0 ⇔ kj > 3tj−αj−2α−j2 ,
which holds by Assumption 1. Note also that Assumption 1 guarantees that the expression
of the Nash profit is positive.
2.1 Two-sided collusion
Suppose that, at the beginning of period τ = 0, platforms may agree to collude using grim
trigger strategies that imply a permanent reversion to the static Nash prices in case of a
deviation from the collusive agreement.
In this section, we consider the scenario in which platforms seek to collude on both sides
of the market. Let us first examine the prices under the most profitable collusive agreement
among those that are sustainable. We restrict our attention to symmetric agreements, i.e.,
such that the two platforms set equal prices on each market side (pAj = p
B
j , for j ∈ {1, 2}).
Denote by:
pi (p1, p2) = pi
i (p1, p2, p1, p2)
the profit of platform i ∈ {A,B} if the two platforms set equal prices pAj = pBj = pj on
each side j ∈ {1, 2}. The most profitable sustainable symmetric agreement involves prices
10As pointed out by Armstrong (2006), Assumption 1.i ensures that the second-order conditions for the
individual profit-maximization are satisfied. In addition, it implies that the second-order conditions for
the maximization problem under two-sided collusion are also satisfied (see footnote 38).
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that solve the following maximization program:
max
(p1,p2)∈R2
pi (p1, p2)
subject to the sustainability constraint (hereafter, ICC):
pi (p1, p2)
1− δ ≥ pi
d (p1, p2) +
δ
1− δpi
N , (4)
where pid(p1, p2) = max(pi1,pi2)pi
i(pi1, p
i
2, p1, p2) is the optimal deviation profit if the collusive
prices are (p1, p2).
2.1.1 Preliminaries
For any given δ ∈ (0, 1), denote by
I (δ) =
{
(p1, p2) ∈ R2 | pi (p1, p2)
1− δ ≥ pi
d (p1, p2) +
δ
1− δpi
N
}
the set of price pairs such that the ICC is satisfied, and by
I¯ (δ) =
{
(p1, p2) ∈ R2 | pi (p1, p2)
1− δ = pi
d (p1, p2) +
δ
1− δpi
N
}
the set of price pairs such that the ICC is binding. Moreover, define
pic (δ) = max
(p1,p2)∈I(δ)
pi (p1, p2)
and
δm =
pid (pm1 , p
m
2 )− pim
pid (pm1 , p
m
2 )− piN
(5)
where (pm1 , p
m
2 ) is the unique solution to the unconstrained maximization program
max
(p1,p2)∈R2
pi (p1, p2) ,
and pim = pi (pm1 , p
m
2 ) is the profit each firm derives from perfect collusion.
The following preliminary results are useful for the subsequent analysis. Lemma 2
shows that the ICC is binding for sufficiently small values of the discount factor and that
the collusive profit is (weakly) increasing in the platform’s discount factor.
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Lemma 2 The prices and profits under the most profitable sustainable agreement satisfy
the following properties:
(i) If δ ∈ (0, δm) and (pc1 (δ) , pc2 (δ)) is a pair of prices in I (δ) such that pic (δ) =
pi (pc1 (δ) , p
c
2 (δ)), then (p
c
1 (δ) , p
c
2 (δ)) ∈ I¯ (δ) .
(ii) pic (δ) < pic (δ′) < pim for any δ, δ′ ∈ (0, δm) such that δ < δ′; and pic (δ) = pim, for
any δ ∈ [δm, 1).
Proof. See Appendix.
The next lemma shows that the price structure under the most profitable sustainable
agreement minimizes the platforms’ incentives to deviate (among all possible price struc-
tures for a given collusive profit).
Lemma 3 Consider δ ∈ (0, δm) and let (pc1 (δ) , pc2 (δ)) be a pair of prices in I (δ) such that
pic (δ) = pi (pc1 (δ) , p
c
2 (δ)). Then, (p
c
1 (δ) , p
c
2 (δ)) is necessarily a solution to the following
constrained minimization program:
min
(p1,p2)∈R2
pid (p1, p2)
subject to
pi (p1, p2) = pi
c (δ) .
Proof. See Appendix.
2.1.2 The most profitable sustainable agreement
We now make use of the previous results to derive the price and welfare effects of (optimal)
two-sided collusion.
Assumption 2
i. k1 ≥ 2t1−α12 and k2 ≥ 2t2−α22 ;
ii. min
{
2t2k1 + (α1 + α2)k2, (α1 + α2)k1 + 2t1k2
} ≥ 4t1t2−(α1+α2)2
2
.
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Assumption 2 imposes conditions on the stand-alone values under which it is optimal
for platforms to fully cover both sides of the market under two-sided collusion.11
Lemma 4 Both sides of the market are fully covered under the most profitable sustainable
two-sided collusive agreement.
Proof. See Appendix.
If platforms set equal prices, there is full coverage of side j ∈ {1, 2} if and only if the
utility of the indifferent consumer, located at x = 1
2
, is non-negative. Thus, the maximum
price that platforms can charge on side j for this side to be fully covered is:12
pmj = p
N
j + u
i
j
(
1
2
, pN1 , p
N
2 , p
N
1 , p
N
2
)
= kj +
αj
2
− tj
2
. (6)
The maximum individual profit under full coverage of both sides of the market is:13
pim =
pm1 + p
m
2
2
=
k1 + k2
2
− pi
N
2
. (7)
In order to compare collusive and competitive prices, we proceed in two steps. First,
we use our characterization of the optimal price structure under collusion (Lemma 3) to
write collusive prices as functions of collusive profits. Second, we rely on the monotonicity
of the collusive profits with respect to platforms’ discount factor (Lemma 2) to derive
the monotonicity of collusive prices with respect to the discount factor, which allows us
to compare these prices to their competitive counterparts. The following lemma shows
that the way prices under the most profitable sustainable agreement relate to the profit
generated by this agreement depends on how the degrees of differentiation t1 and t2 compare
to (α1 + α2) /2. Before stating the result, notice that a scenario in which both t1 and t2
would be below (α1 + α2) /2 is not possible due to Assumption 1,
14 which leaves us with
three possible scenarios.
11This simplifies the analysis by reducing the number of possible demand configurations under collusion.
12For the expression of the Nash prices, pNj , see Lemma 1.
13Assumptions 1 and 2 imply that (piN , pim] 6= ∅.
14To see why, note first that (t1 + t2)
2 ≥ (α1 + α2)2. This, combined with the assumption 4t1t2 >
(α1 +α2)
2, implies that (t1 + t2)
2 > (α1 +α2)
2 and, therefore, that t1 + t2 > α1 +α2. The latter excludes
the scenario in which both t1 and t2 are less than (or equal to) (α1 + α2)/2.
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Lemma 5 For any δ ∈ (0, 1), there exists a unique pair of prices (pc1 (δ) , pc2 (δ)) ∈ I (δ)
satisfying pic (δ) = pi (pc1 (δ) , p
c
2 (δ)). Furthermore:
(i) If t1 <
α1+α2
2
< t2, the collusive prices are:
(pc1 (δ) , p
c
2 (δ)) =

(
α1−α2
2
+ 2t1−α1−α2
t1+t2−α1−α2pi
c(δ), α2−α1
2
+ 2t2−α1−α2
t1+t2−α1−α2pi
c(δ)
)
if 0 < δ ≤ δ˜2
(2pic(δ)− pm2 , pm2 ) if δ˜2 < δ < δm
(pm1 , p
m
2 ) if δ
m ≤ δ < 1,
(8)
where pmj =
2kj−tj+αj
2
, δ˜2 is the solution of pi
c(δ˜2) =
2k2−t2+α1
2t2−α1−α2pi
N , and δm is the
solution of pic(δm) = pim, with pim given by (7).
(ii) If t2 <
α1+α2
2
< t1, the collusive prices are:
(pc1 (δ) , p
c
2 (δ)) =

(
α1−α2
2
+ 2t1−α1−α2
t1+t2−α1−α2pi
c(δ), α2−α1
2
+ 2t2−α1−α2
t1+t2−α1−α2pi
c(δ)
)
if 0 < δ ≤ δ˜1
(pm1 , 2pi
c(δ)− pm1 ) if δ˜1 < δ < δm
(pm1 , p
m
2 ) if δ
m ≤ δ < 1,
(9)
where δ˜1 is the solution of pi
c(δ˜1) =
2k1−t1+α2
2t1−α1−α2pi
N .
(iii) If t1 ≥ α1+α22 and t2 ≥ α1+α22 , the collusive prices are given by (8) if k2(2t1−α1−α2)−
k1(2t2−α1−α2) < piN(α2−α1), and by (9) if k2(2t1−α1−α2)−k1(2t2−α1−α2) >
piN(α2 − α1).
Proof. See Appendix.
This lemma allows us to understand how collusive prices depend on the discount factor
and, therefore, how they compare to competitive prices. To this end, denote P c(δ) =
pc1(δ) + p
c
2(δ) and S
c(δ) = pc2(δ) − pc1(δ) the total price and the price structure under the
most profitable sustainable collusive agreement; and PN = P c(0) and SN = Sc(δ) the total
price and the price structure under the competitive (Nash) equilibrium.
From Lemma 5 it follows that
Sc(δ) = α2 − α1 + 2 (t2 − t1)
t1 + t2 − α1 − α2pi
c(δ).
for δ sufficiently small, i.e., before any of the collusive prices pc1(δ) and p
c
2(δ) reaches it
maximum level. Using the expressions for pN1 , p
N
2 and pi
N provided in Lemma 1, we can
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rewrite the above expression as
Sc(δ) = SN + (t2 − t1) pi
c(δ)− piN
piN
(10)
Thus, the sign of Sc(δ)−SN , which captures the impact of collusion on the price structure,
is the same as the sign of t2 − t1 (over the considered range of δ). This implies that
(optimal) collusion distorts the price structure by leading to more rent extraction from the
side with the larger degree of differentiation, relative to the side with the smaller degree
of differentiation.15 This finding is in line with the traditional result in the (one-sided)
Hotelling setting that, ceteris paribus, collusion is easier to sustain in markets with larger
product differentiation (see e.g. Chang, 1991).
Moreover, equation (10) shows that Sc(δ) is increasing (resp. decreasing) in δ if t2 is
greater (resp. lower) than t1. This is useful for understanding the impact of δ on collusive
prices pc1(δ) and p
c
2(δ). To see why, assume that t1 > (α1 + α2) /2,
16 and consider the
following decomposition:
dpc2
dδ
=
1
2
dP c
dδ︸ ︷︷ ︸
total price effect
+
1
2
dSc
dδ
.︸ ︷︷ ︸
price structure effect
For any δ ∈ [0, δ˜1], the total price effect is always positive because:
1
2
dP c
dδ
=
dpic
dδ
;
while the price structure effect has the same sign as t2 − t1:
1
2
dSc
dδ
=
t2 − t1
2piN
dpic
dδ
Thus, if t2 ≥ t1 then dSc/dδ is weakly positive and, therefore, dpc2/dδ is positive. However,
if t2 < t1 then dS
c/dδ is negative and, therefore, the sign of dpc2/dδ is a priori ambiguous.
To sign the total effect of the discount factor in this case we need to distinguish between
two possible cases. Consider first the scenario in which 1 + t2−t1
2piN
≥ 0 or, equivalently,
t2 ≥ (α1 + α2) /2. In this case, the positive total price effect (weakly) outweighs the
negative price structure effect and, therefore, pc2(δ) is (weakly) increasing in δ over [0, δ˜2].
15In the special case t1 = t2, the additional rents extracted by two platforms that collude are evenly
distributed between the two sides, i.e. the price structure under collusion is the same as under competition.
16This does not entail any loss of generality because Assumption 1 implies that t1 + t2 > α1 +α2, which
in turn implies that we cannot have both t1 ≤ (α1 + α2) /2 and t2 ≤ (α1 + α2) /2.
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Consider now the scenario in which 1 + t2−t1
2piN
< 0 or, equivalently, t2 < (α1 + α2) /2. In
this case, the negative price structure effect outweighs the positive total price effect and,
therefore, pc2(δ) is decreasing in δ over [0, δ˜1], which implies that the collusive price p
c
2(δ)
is lower than the competitive (Nash) price on that side over the considered range. Thus,
the distortion of the price structure induced by collusion in this scenario is so strong that
it results in a decrease in the price of side 2 (despite the increase in the total price). Note,
however, that pc2(δ) is always increasing over [δ˜1, δ
m] as pc2(δ) = 2pi
c (δ) − pm1 over that
interval. Therefore, we reach the following conclusion: (i) if t2 > (α1 + α2) /2, then p
c
2(δ)
is increasing over [0, δm]; (ii) if t2 < (α1 + α2) /2 then p
c
2(δ) is decreasing over [0, δ˜1] and
increasing over [δ˜1, δ
m].17 The following figure plots the collusive prices as functions of the
discount factor.
δ� δ� � δ
���
���
������
(��� � ��� )
(a) t1 <
α1+α2
2 < t2
δ� δ� � δ��
�
���
���
���
(��� � ��� )
(b) t2 <
α1+α2
2 < t1
� δ� δ� � δ
������
���
���
(��� � ��� )
(c) t1 >
α1+α2
2 ∧ t2 > α1+α22
Figure 1: Collusive prices under the most profitable sustainable agreement.
Using the above analysis, we can show the following result about the comparison of the
collusive prices generating the most profitable two-sided sustainable agreement and the
competitive prices.
Proposition 1 Two-sided collusion can lead to either higher prices on both sides of the
market or higher prices on one side and lower prices on the other side. More specifically:
(i) If t1 >
α1+α2
2
and t2 >
α1+α2
2
then pc1(δ) > p
N
1 and p
c
2(δ) > p
N
2 for any δ ∈ (0, 1].
(ii) If t2 <
α1+α2
2
< t1 then p
c
1(δ) > p
N
1 for any δ ∈ (0, 1] and there exists a threshold
δˆ2 ∈ (δ˜1, δm) such that pc2(δ) < pN2 for any δ ∈ (0, δˆ2), and pc2(δ) > pN2 for any
δ ∈ (δˆ2, 1].
17In the knife-edge case where t2 = (α1 + α2) /2, p
c
2(δ) is constant over [0, δ˜1] and increasing over
[δ˜1, δ
m].
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(iii) If t1 <
α1+α2
2
< t2 then p
c
2(δ) > p
N
2 for any δ ∈ (0, 1] and there exists a threshold
δˆ1 ∈ (δ˜2, δm) such that pc1(δ) < pN1 for any δ ∈ (0, δˆ1), and pc1(δ) > pN1 for any
δ ∈ (δˆ1, 1].
Proof. See Appendix.
The fact that the market is fully (and symmetrically) covered under both competition
and collusion in the considered parameter constellation, combined with the assumption
that users single-home on both sides of the market, implies that, in our baseline model,
(i) collusion does not affect total welfare (which means that the effect on aggregate users
surplus is necessarily negative), and (ii) the impact of collusion on the users on each side
is fully determined by the comparison of the collusive and competitive prices. Thus, we
get the following result.
Corollary 1 In the model with single-homing on both sides, two-sided collusion does not
affect total welfare. Furthermore, it can be either detrimental to users on both sides of the
market, or detrimental to users on one side and beneficial to users on the other side. More
specifically:
(i) If t1 >
α1+α2
2
and t2 >
α1+α2
2
, users on both sides of the market are harmed by
collusion for any δ ∈ (0, 1].
(ii) If t2 <
α1+α2
2
< t1, side-1 users are harmed by collusion for any δ ∈ (0, 1], while side-2
users benefit from collusion if δ ∈ (0, δˆ2) and are harmed by collusion if δ ∈ (δˆ2, 1].
(iii) If t1 <
α1+α2
2
< t2, side-2 users are harmed by collusion for any δ ∈ (0, 1], while side-1
users benefit from collusion if δ ∈ (0, δˆ1) and are harmed by collusion if δ ∈ (δˆ1, 1].
2.2 One-sided collusion
Let us now investigate the most profitable sustainable agreement when platforms collude
on a single side of the market. Without loss of generality, suppose that platforms collude
over the price on side 1 and set non-cooperatively the price on side 2. We restrict the
analysis to symmetric collusive agreements, i.e., such that the platforms set the same price
on the collusive side (i.e., pA1 = p
B
1 = p1). Thus, given δ ∈ (0, 1), the most profitable
sustainable one-sided symmetric agreement features a price on side 1 that solves:
max
p1
{
piA(p1, p
A
2 , p1, p
B
2 ) + pi
B(p1, p
A
2 , p1, p
B
2 )
}
(11)
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subject to the following constraints:
pA2 = argmaxp˜2 pi
A
(
p1, p˜2, p1, p
B
2
)
pB2 = argmaxp˜2 pi
B
(
p1, p
A
2 , p1, p˜2
)
p1 ∈
{
p1 ∈ R | pi
A(p1,pA2 ,p1,pB2 )
1−δ ≥ max(p˜1,p˜2) piA(p˜1, p˜2, p1, pB2 ) + δ1−δpiN
}
≡ Ioc (δ, pA2 , pB2 ) .
(12)
Combining the first two constraints, we obtain:18
pA2 = p
B
2 = p2 =
t1t2 − α1α2
t1
− α1
t1
p1 ≡ g (p1) , (13)
and can rewrite the above maximization program as:
max
p1
{
piA(p1, p2, p1, p2) + pi
B(p1, p2, p1, p2)
}
subject to:  p2 = g (p1)p1 ∈ Ioc (δ, p2, p2) .
For a given δ ∈ (0, 1), let poc1 (δ) denote the solution to this constrained maximization
program, and poc2 (δ) the corresponding price on the non-cooperative side 2.
19 Moreover,
define:
∆pj ≡ pocj (δ)− pNj
as the effect of one-sided collusion on the price on side j ∈ {1, 2}. Even though platforms
collude only on side 1, the price on side 2 is also affected by collusion due to the existence
of cross-group externalities. Notice that:
∆p2 = p
oc
2 (δ)− pN2 = g (poc1 (δ))− g(pN1 ) =
poc1 (δ)∫
pN1
g′(p1)dp1. (14)
Thus, if g′(p1) > 0, then ∆p1 and ∆p2 have the same sign; if g′(p1), ∆p1 and ∆p2 have
opposite signs. In other words, if increasing the price on the collusive side strengthens
competition on the non-cooperative side (i.e. g′(p1) < 0), the price on one side of the
18The second-order conditions corresponding to the choice of p2 are satisfied, as
d2pii
d(pi2)
2 = − t1t1t2−α1α2 < 0.
19The existence and uniqueness of the solution are established later.
15
market will be supra-competitive, while the other will be infra-competitive.20 In contrast,
if increasing the price on the collusive side softens competition on the non-cooperative
side, (i.e. g′(p1) > 0), prices are supra-competitive on both sides of the market. More
precisely, from condition (14), we conclude that, if g′(p1) > 0, prices on both sides are
either supra-competitive or infra-competitive. However, as there is no scope for demand
expansion on either side (because both sides are already fully covered under competition,
by Assumption 1), platforms would never find it optimal to adopt a one-sided collusive
scheme that induces below-Nash prices on both sides of the market.21
Lemma 6 The most profitable one-sided sustainable agreement leads to price variations
across sides that are related as follows:
∆p2 = −α1
t1
∆p1. (15)
Proof. Deriving function g, given in (13), with respect to p1 and replacing it in (14), we
obtain:
∆p2 =
poc1 (δ)∫
pN1
g′(p1)dp1 = −α1
t1
[
poc1 (δ)− pN1
]
= −α1
t1
∆p1
Let us explore the intuition behind Lemma 6. Suppose, for instance, that platforms set
a supra-competitive price on the collusive side, i.e., poc1 > p
N
1 . Then, users on side 1 are
more valuable to platforms under collusion than under competition. As a result, platforms
would like to increase their market share on side 1, as compared to the competitive scenario.
As p1 is fixed by the collusive agreement, the only way for a platform to conquer more
side-1 users without triggering a punishment from the rival platform is to increase the
attractiveness of its platform to these users, by changing the number of users on side 2.
If α1 > 0, side-1 users like the presence of side-2 users, and platforms have, therefore,
incentives to decrease p2. In contrast, if α1 < 0, each platform has incentives to increase
p2 to attract less side-2 users, and increase its attractiveness to side-1 users. Naturally,
if poc1 < p
N
1 , the reasoning is exactly the opposite: as collusion makes side-1 users less
20Please notice that we are not stating that platforms will set a supra-competitive price on the (coop-
erative) side 1. Indeed, as we will see below, this many not be the case.
21In the case where there is multi-homing on one side of the market, studied in Section 3, this is no
longer the case.
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valuable to platforms, they use p2 to decrease the value that side-1 users get from joining
a platform.
To gain further insights we need to distinguish between the scenario in which the ICC:
piA (p1, g (p1) , p1, g (p1))
1− δ ≥ max(p˜1,p˜2) pi
A(p˜1, p˜2, p1, g (p1)) +
δ
1− δpi
N
is binding (imperfect one-sided collusion) and the scenario in which it is not (perfect one-
sided collusion). Given δ ∈ (0, 1), let pioc (δ) be the highest sustainable profit under one-
sided collusion, and piom be the firm’s profit when the ICC is not binding. As in the case
of two-sided collusion, one can show that there exists a unique threshold δom ∈ (0, 1) such
that pioc (δ) < piom if and only if δ < δom, and that pioc (δ) is increasing in δ over [0, δom].22
Let us first consider that perfect one-sided collusion is sustainable, i.e., δ ≥ δom. In this
scenario, firms can pick the price structure (i.e., how they balance the prices across sides)
they want without caring about sustainability issues. Let pom1 denote the firms’ optimal
price on side 1 in this case, i.e., pom1 = p
oc
1 (δ) for any δ ≥ δom. Using (13), we know
that, if α1 < 0, a decrease in p1 would lead to a decrease in p2 and, therefore, would be
unprofitable. Therefore, if α1 < 0 then p
om
1 > p
N
1 and p
om
2 > p
N
2 . In contrast, if α1 > 0,
an increase in p1 is followed by a decrease in p2. Thus, charging an above-Nash price on
the collusive side is only profitable if the gain on this side, pom1 − pN1 , outweighs the loss on
side 2, α1
t1
(
pom1 − pN1
)
, which is the case if and only if α1 < t1. If, instead, α1 > t1, side-1
users are so valuable that platforms decrease p2 so much (to increase their attractiveness
on side 1) that the profit loss on side 2 outweighs the profit gain on side 1. These results
are summarized in the following proposition.
Proposition 2 Assume that δ ≥ δom.
(i) If α1 < 0, the prices under the most profitable one-sided agreement are above their
static Nash levels on both sides of the market.
(ii) If α1 > 0, the prices under the most profitable one-sided agreement are such that the
price on one side is above its static Nash level while the price on the other side is
below its static Nash level.
More precisely, the following holds:
22This follows from the fact that an increase in δ does not affect the firms’ objective function but
relaxes the constraints (or, equivalently, widen the subspace of prices over which firms maximize their
joint profits), combined with the fact the ICC is binding for δ lower than δom.
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0 t1
↵1
pom1 > p
N
1
pom2 > p
N
2
pom1 > p
N
1
pom2 < p
N
2
pom1 < p
N
1
pom2 > p
N
2
1
When the cross-group externalities exerted on the collusive side are positive (α1 > 0),
the relative price variation on the two sides due to collusion depends on the ratio between
the strength of these externalities and the degree of differentiation on the collusive side,
α1
t1
. If |α1| > t1, the price variation due to collusion is higher in the non-cooperative side:
|∆p2| > |∆p1|. In contrast, if |α1| < t1, the price variation is higher in the collusive side:
|∆p1| > |∆p2|. This is due to the fact that an additional side-2 agent attracts α1t1 additional
side-1 users to a platform (Armstrong, 2006). If α1 = t1, any price change in the collusive
side is accompanied by a change of the same magnitude but on the opposite direction on
side 2. Therefore, if α1 = t1, the (one-period) collusive profit coincides with the static Nash
profit, corresponding to the conjecture of Evans and Schmalensee (2008) that if platforms
“agree to fix prices on one side only, the cartel members will tend to compete the supra-
competitive profits away on the other side.” (p. 689) We prove, however, that this only
happens in that very particular case.23 More importantly, our analysis points out a fun-
damental problem with the logic behind Evans and Schmalensee’s conjecture: their claim
hinges on the implicit assumption that platforms colluding on a single of side of a market
will seek to increase their rents (above their competitive level) on that side. However, our
analysis shows that platforms colluding on a single side of the market may prefer to make
infra-competitive profits on that side and increase their rents on the competitive side of the
market.
To show that the price comparison under one-sided collusion and competition provided
in Proposition 2 extends to the case of imperfect one sided-collusion (i.e., for δ < δom), we
make Assumption 3,
Assumption 3 The stand-alone values on both sides, k1 and k2, are sufficiently high for
both market sides to be fully covered under the most profitable sustainable one-sided collusive
agreement.
23Dewenter et al. (2011) also find that the claim by Evans and Schmalensee (2008) is true only in a
very special case in their model.
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Lemma 7 Let u˜Nj ≡ uij(12 , pN1 , pN2 , pN1 , pN2 ) denote the utility of the side-j agent located at
x = 1
2
if platforms set the static Nash prices, and pioc(δ) denote the highest collusive profit
that platforms can sustain for a given δ. The corresponding collusive prices (poc1 (δ) , p
oc
2 (δ))
are as follows:
1. If − u˜N2
u˜N1
t1 ≤ α1 ≤ t1:
(poc1 (δ) , p
oc
2 (δ)) =

(
2t1
t1−α1pi
oc(δ)− t1t2−α1α2
t1−α1 ,
t1t2−α1α2
t1−α1 − α1t1−α1pioc(δ)
)
if 0 < δ ≤ δ˜om(
pm1 ,
t1t2−α1α2
t1
− α1
t1
pm1
)
if δ˜om ≤ δ < 1,
(16)
where pm1 is given by (6), and δ˜
om is implicitly defined by pioc(δ˜om) = 2k1(t1−α1)−(t1−α1)
2+2(t1t2−α1α2)
4t1
.
2. If α1 < − u˜
N
2
u˜N1
t1 or α1 > t1:
(poc1 (δ) , p
oc
2 (δ)) =

(
2t1
t1−α1pi
oc(δ)− t1t2−α1α2
t1−α1 ,
t1t2−α1α2
t1−α1 − α1t1−α1pioc(δ)
)
if 0 < δ ≤ δˆom(
pN1 − t1α1 u˜N2 , pm2
)
if δˆom ≤ δ < 1,
(17)
where pm2 is given by (6), and δˆ
om is implicitly defined by pioc(δˆom) = 2k2(α1−t1)+3t1t2−α1α2−α1t2−α2t1
4α1
.
Proof. See Appendix.
From the previous proposition and the definition of δom it follows that:
δom =
 δ˜om if −
u˜N2
u˜N1
t1 ≤ α1 ≤ t1
δˆom if α1 < − u˜
N
2
u˜N1
t1 ∨ α1 > t1
As pioc(δ) is increasing in δ for δ < δom and poc1 (0) = p
N
1 and p
oc
2 (0) = p
N
2 , it is
straightforward to derive the monotonicity of the prices (poc1 (δ), p
oc
2 (δ)) under one-sided
collusion with respect to δ over the interval [0, δom]. More precisely, there are three possible
scenarios: (i) if α1 < 0, the prices on both sides increase in δ, (ii) if 0 ≤ α1 < t1, the price
on side 1 increases in δ while the price on side 2 decreases in δ, and (iii) if α1 ≥ t1, the
price on side 1 decreases in δ while the price on side 2 increases in δ. This, combined with
the fact that poc1 (0) = p
N
1 and p
oc
2 (0) = p
N
2 , leads to the following result.
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Proposition 3 The comparison of prices under one-sided collusion (on side 1) and static
Nash prices depends on α1 and t1 as follows:
(i) If α1 < 0, prices under one-sided collusion are above their static Nash levels on both
sides: poc1 (δ) > p
N
1 and p
oc
2 (δ) > p
N
2 .
(ii) If 0 ≤ α1 < t1, the price on the collusive side under one-sided collusion is above its
static Nash level while the price on the competitive side under one-sided collusion is
below its static Nash level: poc1 (δ) > p
N
1 and p
oc
2 (δ) ≤ pN2 .
(iii) If α1 ≥ t1, the price on the collusive side under one-sided collusion is below its static
Nash level while the price on the competitive side under one-sided collusion is above
the static Nash level: poc1 (δ) ≤ pN1 and poc2 (δ) > pN2 .
Argentesi and Filistrucchi (2007) provide empirical support for the existence of one-
sided collusion on the reader side of the newspaper market. Under the assumption that
readers are not affected (neither positively nor negatively) by advertising and that there
is single-homing on both sides of the market, they find that the markups on the reader
side are greater than those in the counterfactual competitive scenario while the markups
on the advertising side are the same. This empirical finding is in line with the prediction
of Proposition 3 in the special case α1 = 0.
24
We can now state the welfare effects of one-sided collusion. Again, the fact that the
market is fully and symmetrically covered under both collusion and competition implies
that collusion is neutral for total welfare and that its impact on the users of a given side
is determined solely by its effect on prices.
Corollary 2 In the model with single-homing on both sides, one-sided collusion on side
1 does not affect total welfare, and can either harm users on both sides of the market or
benefits users on one of the two sides and harm users on the other side. More specifically:
(i) If α1 < 0, users on both market sides are harmed. Users on the collusive side are
more harmed than users on the competitive side if and only if |α1| > t1.
24Argentesi and Filistrucchi (2007) justify the use of an empirical model with single-homing on both
sides by the observation that, in each day of the week, 84% of advertisers put an ad in only one of the four
newspapers they consider. Note, however, that their empirical finding is also consistent with the prediction
of the competitive bottleneck model in the next section regarding the impact of two-sided collusion on
prices (if we consider, following most of the literature, that there is single-homing on the reader side and
multi-homing on the advertising side).
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(ii) If 0 ≤ α1 < t1, users on the collusive side are harmed by collusion, while users on
the competitive side benefit from collusion.
(iii) If α1 ≥ t1, users on the collusive side benefit from collusion, while users on the
competitive side are harmed by collusion.
3 Extension: Competitive bottleneck setting
Let us now study the price and welfare effects of collusion when users on one side of the
market can join both platforms (i.e., multi-home), while users on the other side of the
market continue to be able to join just one platform (i.e., single-home). We rely for this
on a repeated version of the competitive bottleneck model considered by Belleflamme and
Peitz (2019). Without loss of generality, let side 1 be the side where users can multi-home.
Figure 2 presents the demand on each side of the market, where x˜j1 denotes the consumer
on side 1 that is indifferent between joining platform j ∈ {A,B} and not joining this
platform; while x˜2 is the agent on side 2 that is indifferent between joining platforms A
and B.
0 1x˜B1 x˜
A
1
- 
- 
Join Platform A
Join Platform B
Single-homers (A) Multi-homers Single-homers (B)
Side 1
0 1x˜2
-  - 
Join Platform A Join Platform B
Side 2
1
Figure 2: Demand configuration with multi-homing on side 1 and single-homing on side 2.
We will focus on the scenario where, on side 1, users that join a single platform co-exist
with users that join both platforms, i.e., 0 < x˜B1 < x˜
A
1 < 1. We will refer to this situation
as partial multi-homing on side 1.
The utility function for single-homers (a subset of the users on side 1 and all users on
side 2) is the same as in the baseline model.25 For the specification of the utility function
of the multi-homers, we follow Belleflamme and Peitz (2019). We assume, as they do
in their baseline model, that multi-homers get the sum of the stand-alone values from
25See Expression (1)
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each platform (which is assumed to be the same across platforms, k1).
26 Moreover, multi-
homers can interact with all users on side 2 and, therefore, benefit from a total network
externality of α1. Finally, multi-homers pay the membership fee to both platforms and
their transportation cost is the sum of the transportation costs of joining the two platforms
separately, i.e., t1x+ t1(1− x) = t1. Thus, the utility function of a multi-homer on side 1
is:
uib1 (p
A
1 , p
B
1 ) = 2k1 + α1 − t1 − pA1 − pB1 ,
which, in contrast to the utility function of single-homers, does not depend on the location
of the agent.
To present shorter mathematical expressions, let us introduce the following additional
notation:
Ω ≡ 8t1t2 − α21 − 6α1α2 − α22. (18)
Assumption 4 (Belleflamme and Peitz, 2019)27
i. Ω > 0.
ii. 2t1 − α1 − α2 < 2k1 < 4t1 − α1 − α2.
iii. 2(α1 + α2)k1 + 4t1k2 > 6(t1t2 − α1α2)− (α1 − α2)2.
Under this assumption, the demand functions for platform i ∈ {A,B} on sides 1 and 2 are
given, respectively, by:28
nib1 (p
i
1, p
i
2, p
−i
1 , p
−i
2 ) =
α1
t1
[
1
2
+
α2(p
−i
1 − pi1) + t1(p−i2 − pi2)
2(t1t2 − α1α2)
]
+
k1 − pi1
t1
(19)
and
nib2 (p
i
1, p
i
2, p
−i
1 , p
−i
2 ) =
1
2
+
α2(p
−i
1 − pi1) + t1(p−i2 − pi2)
2(t1t2 − α1α2) . (20)
26In contrast, Armstrong and Wright (2007) and Rash (2007) assume that joining a second platform
does not generate any extra stand-alone benefit. A more general assumption that would encompass their
assumption and the one we make as particular cases, would be to consider that the stand-alone value of
a multi-homer is given by (1 + γ)k1, where γ is between 0 and 1 (see Appendix A.4 of Belleflamme and
Peitz, 2019). However, this would imply additional notations, without providing richer results.
27This assumption guarantees that the second-order conditions for the individual profit maximization
problem are satisfied and that there is no tipping in equilibrium (part i). It also ensures that, under Nash
competition, there is partial multi-homing on side 1 (part ii) and full market coverage of side 2 (part iii).
28For details, see Belleflamme and Peitz (2019).
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When platforms set symmetric prices, i.e., pA1 = p
B
1 = p1 and p
A
2 = p
B
2 = p2, the individual
demands become: nb1(p1) =
2k1+α1−2p1
2t1
and nb2 =
1
2
. A key difference with our baseline
model is the existence of a demand expansion effect on the multi-homing side, captured by
the fact that nb1 is decreasing in p1.
As in the baseline model, we assume that the marginal cost to serve each side of the
market is constant and normalized to zero. Thus, the individual profit function of platform
i ∈ {A,B} is:
piib = pi1n
ib
1 + p
i
2n
ib
2 . (21)
We first provide the prices, demands and profits in the static Nash equilibrium of the
game.
Proposition 4 (Belleflamme and Peitz, 2019). The static Nash equilibrium in the
competitive bottleneck model considered above is such that:
- platforms set symmetric prices, pNb1 =
2k1+α1−α2
4
and pNb2 = t2 − α1(2k1+α1+3α2)4t1 .
- there is partial multi-homing on side 1 and full coverage of side 2.
- the number of users joining each platform is nNb1 =
2k1+α1+α2
4t1
and nNb2 =
1
2
.
- the profit of each platform is piNb = 4k1
2+Ω
16t1
.
Proof. See Belleflamme and Peitz (2019).
Let us now provide the expressions of the aggregate surplus of users on each side of the
market and total welfare when platforms set symmetric prices, p1 and p2. The aggregate
surplus of users on the multi-homing side (side 1) is:
CSb1 =
1−nb1∫
0
(k1 +
α1
2
− p1 − t1x)dx+
nb1∫
1−nb1
(2k1 + α1 − 2p1 − t1)dx+
1∫
nb1
(k1 +
α1
2
− p1 − t1(1− x))dx
= nb1
(
2k1 + α1 − 2p1 − nb1t1
)
, (22)
while the aggregate surplus of users on the single-homing side (side 2) is:
CSb2 =
1
2∫
0
(k2 + α2n
b
1 − p2 − t2x)dx+
1∫
1
2
[k2 + α2n
b
1 − p2 − t2(1− x)]dx
= k2 + α2n
b
1 − p2 −
t2
4
. (23)
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Thus, total welfare with symmetric prices is:
W b = CSb1 + CS
b
2 + pi
Ab + piBb = nb1(2k1 + α1 + α2 − nb1t1) + k2 −
t2
4
, (24)
which does not depend on prices because they are non-distortionary transfers between
users and platforms in our setting. The following lemma is useful for our subsequent
welfare analysis as it shows that the impact of a (symmetric) change in prices on welfare
is solely driven by its impact on the number of multi-homers.
Lemma 8 If platforms set symmetric prices (i.e., pA1 = p
B
1 and p
A
2 = p
B
2 ) that induce
partial multi-homing on side 1 and full market coverage on side 2, total welfare is greater
than under Nash competition if and only if the number of multi-homers is greater than
under Nash competition (nb1 > n
Nb
1 ).
Proof. See Appendix.
As in the baseline model, we assume that platforms interact for an infinite number of
periods and, in each period, they choose the price to charge on each side of the market and
have a common discount factor, δ ∈ (0, 1). Again, for any δ ∈ (0, 1), we will study the most
profitable sustainable collusive agreement both when platforms collude on the two sides
of the market and when they only collude on one side of the market. In contrast to the
baseline setting, in the competitive bottleneck model, the two sides of the market are not
symmetric and, therefore, a one-sided collusive agreement is expected to be qualitatively
different depending on whether it targets the price on side 1 or side 2. Thus, we will
analyze three possible collusive scenarios: (i) platforms set both prices cooperatively (two-
sided collusion); (ii) platforms set the price on side 2 cooperatively and the price on side
1 non-cooperatively (collusion on the single-homing side only); and, finally, (iii) platforms
set the price on side 1 cooperatively and the price on side 2 non-cooperatively (collusion
on the multi-homing side only). As in the baseline model, we assume that platforms adopt
grim trigger strategies to punish deviations from the collusive path, i.e., they permanently
revert to the Nash equilibrium of the stage game (Proposition 4) if one platform defects.
We will focus on the constellations of model parameters for which there is partial multi-
homing on side 1 and full market coverage of side 2 under all the considered competitive
scenarios (i.e. competition on both sides, two-sided collusion, and one-sided collusion on
side 1 or side 2).
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3.1 Two-sided collusion
Assume that platforms cooperatively set symmetric prices on both sides of the market.
Hence, for a given δ, they choose prices pcb1 and p
cb
2 that solve:
max
(p1,p2)∈R2
{
piAb(p1, p2, p1, p2) + pi
Bb(p1, p2, p1, p2)
}
subject to the incentive compatibility constraint:
piib(p1, p2, p1, p2)
1− δ ≥ pi
db (p1, p2) +
δ
1− δpi
Nb,
where pidb(p1, p2) = max(pi1,pi2)pi
ib(pi1, p
i
2, p1, p2) is the optimal deviation profit if the collusive
prices are p1 and p2.
The following proposition characterizes prices and profits under the most profitable
sustainable collusive agreement.
Proposition 5 In the competitive bottleneck model, for a given 0 < δ < 1, the most
profitable agreement among the sustainable and symmetric two-sided collusive agreements
is such that:
- platforms charge the Nash price on the multi-homing side, pcb1 (δ) = p
Nb
1 , and a supra-
competitive price on the single-homing side:
pcb2 (δ) =
{
pNb2 +
Ω
2t1
δ
1−δ if 0 < δ < δ
mb
pmb2 if δ
mb ≤ δ < 1, (25)
where pmb2 = k2 − t22 + α2(2k1+α1+α2)4t1 and δmb ≡ 1− 2ΩΩ+2k1(α1+α2)+4k2t1+2(t1t2−α1α2) ,
- the number of users that join each platform on each side of the market is the same
as in the static Nash equilibrium.
- the individual profit is:
picb(δ) =
{
piNb + Ω
2t1
δ
1−δ if 0 < δ < δ
mb
pimb if δmb ≤ δ < 1,
where pimb = 2k2−t2
4
+ (2k1+α1+α2)
2
16t1
.
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Proof. See Appendix.
When platforms collude on both sides of the market, they set the static Nash price
on the multi-homing side. The intuition behind this finding is that, for fixed demands on
the single-homing side, firms do not compete on the multi-homing side. Interestingly, our
subsequent analysis will show that a crucial condition for prices to remain unchanged on
the multi-homing side is that firms collude on both sides of the market.
The result that the price on the multi-homing side is not affected by two-sided collusion,
combined with our assumption that the single-shoming side of the market is fully (and
symmetrically) covered under both competition and two-sided collusion, implies that the
latter has no effect on the demands on any side of the market. As a result, two-sided
collusion causes no harm to users on side 1, as they pay the same price and benefit from
the same network externalities as under competition. In contrast, users on side 2 are
harmed by collusion, as they pay a higher price and receive the same network externalities.
Finally, from Lemma 8, it follows that two-sided collusion does not affect total welfare
since it does not affect the number of multi-homers.
Corollary 3 In the competitive bottleneck model, two-sided collusion:
- has no impact on users on the multi-homing side.
- harms users on the single-homing side.
- has no impact on total welfare.
3.2 Collusion on the single-homing side only
Let us now characterize the most profitable collusive agreement when platforms collude on
the single-homing side and choose the price on the multi-homing side non-cooperatively.
The formulation of the optimization problem is similar to the one presented in the baseline
model in the scenario of one-sided collusion. The only difference concerns the expression
for the demand function on side 1. Thus, given δ ∈ (0, 1), the most profitable sustainable
symmetric agreement when platforms collude on the single-homing side features pc2b2 that
solves:
max
p2∈R
{
piAb(pA1 , p2, p
B
1 , p2) + pi
Bb(pA1 , p2, p
B
1 , p2)
}
(26)
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subject to the constraints:
pA1 = argmaxp˜1 pi
Ab
(
p˜1, p2, p
B
1 , p2
)
pB1 = argmaxp˜1 pi
Bb
(
pA1 , p2, p˜1, p2
)
p2 ∈
{
p2 ∈ R | pi
Ab(pA1 ,p2,pB1 ,p2)
1−δ ≥ max(p˜1,p˜2) piAb(p˜1, p˜2, pB1 , p2) + δ1−δpiNb
}
.
(27)
Solving the FOCs corresponding to the maximization problems underlying the first two
constraints, we get that the price charged by platform i ∈ {A,B} on side 1 relates to the
collusive price charged on side 2 as follows:
pi1 =
(2k1 + α1)(t1t2 − α1α2)
4t1t2 − 3α1α2 −
α2t1
4t1t2 − 3α1α2p2 ≡ f (p2) , i ∈ {A,B}. (28)
Thus, given the collusive price on side 2, pc2b2 , the price on the non-cooperative side 1
is pc2b1 = f(p
c2b
2 ).
Lemma 9 In the competitive bottleneck model, the price variations induced by (one-sided)
collusion on the single-homing side relate as follows:
∆p1 = − α2t1
4t1t2 − 3α1α2 ∆p2 where ∆pj = p
c2b
j − pNbj . (29)
Proof. This can be easily shown following the same steps as in the proof of Lemma 6.
Notice the similarity between Lemmata 6 and 9. In particular, note that in both
settings, the way signs of the price variation on the two sides of the market are interrelated
depends only on the sign of the cross-group externalities received by the users on the
cooperative side.29 Also, the intuition presented for Lemma 6 still applies to Lemma 9.
Proposition 6 In the competitive bottleneck model, if platforms collude only on the single-
homing side, prices relate to their static Nash counterparts as follows:30
29Notice that Assumption 4.i. implies that 4t1t2 − 3α1α2 > 0
30The analytical expressions for α2 and α¯2 are provided in (57), in the Appendix.
27
✲α2 0 α¯2
α2
pc2b1 < p
Nb
1
pc2b2 < p
Nb
2
pc2b1 > p
Nb
1
pc2b2 > p
Nb
2
pc2b1 < p
Nb
1
pc2b2 > p
Nb
2
pc2b1 > p
Nb
1
pc2b2 < p
Nb
2
1
Proof. See Appendix.
A first remark to be made is that the qualitative effects of one-sided collusion on prices
in this setting are close to those obtained under one-sided collusion in the baseline model
(Proposition 2). The only exception concerns the case where users on the competitive side
exert a sufficiently strong negative externality on users on the collusive side. More precisely,
in the competitive bottleneck setting, when α2 < α2, platforms charge infra-competitive
prices on both sides of the market under one-side collusion over the single-homing side. Such
a scenario is clearly unprofitable in the baseline setting as decreasing both prices would lead
to a decrease in margins on both sides without leading to an increase in demand (on any of
the two sides). This is no longer true in the competitive bottleneck setting. From Lemma
9, if α2 < 0, setting a supra-competitive (resp. infra-competitive) price on the collusive
side leads to a supra-competitive (resp. infra-competitive) price on the competitive side.
As a result, setting p2 < p
Nb
2 in this case has two negative effects on profits: it decreases
revenues on the single-homing side (as there is no demand expansion on this side) and it
decreases the revenue per user on the multi-homing side (as p2 < p
Nb
2 implies p1 < p
Nb
1 in
this case); but it also has a positive effect: demand expands on the multi-homing side (as
more users join both platforms).31 Platforms will set an infra-competitive price on side
2 if and only if this positive effect outweighs the negative effects on profits, which is the
case if and only if α2 is sufficiently negative. More precisely, when α2 < α2, users on side
2 strongly dislike the presence of users on side 1, which limits the extent to which it is
profitable to expand demand on side 1 (as this will strongly decrease the willingness to pay
of users on side 2).
Deriving the welfare effects of collusion in this setting is less straightfoward than in
the baseline model. Let us start with the way collusion affects users on the collusive side
(side 2). As the agreement has no impact on the demand on this side, we only need to
examine the effects on the price p2 and on the externalities exerted by users on side 1 on
side 2-users. It is immediate to see that, from the perspective of users on side 2, these are
31As demand on side 2 is not affected by collusion, the externality that users on side 2 exert on users
on side 1 is also not affected by collusion. As a result, a decrease in p1 surely increases demand on side 1.
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opposite effects. Simple computations allow us to conclude that, regardless of the value for
α2, collusion always harms the indifferent consumer (located at x =
1
2
).32 Since all users
on side 2 are affected in the same way by collusion (they experience the same variation
in prices and in network externalities), we can conclude that collusion harms all users on
side 2. Thus, even when users on side 2 pay an infra-competitive price, they are worse off
under collusion because the negative impact on the cross-group externalities they receive
dominates the positive price effect.
Let us now address the impact of collusion on users on the competitive side (side 1).
To do that, consider a (hypothetical) situation where platforms set symmetric prices p1
and p2, and platform A serves 1− x˜1 users on side 1, while platform B serves x˜1 users (see
Figure 3). Assume that side 2 is fully covered. Suppose now that both platforms decrease
p1 by the same amount, and that side 2 remains covered. An immediate consequence is
that the number of multi-homers increases, say to x ∈ (x˜′1, 1 − x˜′1) with x˜′1 < x˜1. Users
that did not change their decision about joining one platform or both, i.e., all users except
those located at x ∈ [x˜′1, x˜1]∪ [1− x˜1, 1− x˜′1], are better off with the decrease in p1, as they
pay a lower price, incur the same transportation costs, and benefit from the same network
externalities. The only doubt could arise with respect to users that initially are single-
homers but decide to multi-home when p1 decreases, since everything changes for them
(price, transportation cost, stand-alone value and externalities). Notice, however, that if
these users start preferring to multi-home, this is because their utility is greater than if
they continued to single-home. As explained just before, if they continued to single-home,
they will be better off with the decrease in p1. Therefore, by transitivity, they also benefit
from the reduction in p1. Thus, the surplus of users on side 1 is the higher the lower is p1
as long as side 2 remains fully covered.
0 1x˜1 1  x˜1x˜01 1  x˜01
2
Figure 3: Impact of an increase in p1 on the demand on side 1 (for n2 fixed).
Finally, from Lemma 8 it follows that one-sided collusion on the single-homing side
32More precisely, replacing the expressions for the collusive price, given in (63), and Nash prices, given
in Proposition 4, in the utility function (1), we obtain: uj2
(
1
2 , f(p
c2b
2 (δ)), p
c2b
2 (δ), f(p
c2b
2 (δ)), p
c2b
2 (δ)
) −
uj2
(
1
2 , p
Nb
1 , p
Nb
2 , p
Nb
1 , p
Nb
2
)
= − Γ2δΩ
2t1[α22Ω+Γ2(1−δ)]
, with Γ ≡ 4t1t2 − 3α1α2 − α22 and j ∈ {A,B}.
As, by Assumption 4i, Ω > 0, we conclude that uj2
(
1
2 , f(p
c2b
2 (δ)), p
c2b
2 (δ), f(p
c2b
2 (δ)), p
c2b
2 (δ)
)
<
uj2
(
1
2 , p
Nb
1 , p
Nb
2 , p
Nb
1 , p
Nb
2
)
.
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raises (resp. reduces) total welfare whenever it leads to an increase (resp. decrease) in
the number of multi-homers on side 1. Given that side 2 is fully covered, this happens if
platforms set an infra-competitive (resp. supra-competitive) price on side 1 (i.e. pc2b1 <
pNb1 ). Proposition 6 provides the conditions under which this occurs.
Corollary 4 In the competitive bottleneck model, collusion on the single-homing side (only):
- always harms users on the single-homing side;
- benefits users on the multi-homing side if and only if these users exert sufficiently
strong (positive or negative) externalities on users on the single-homing side (i.e.,
α2 < α2 or α2 > α¯2);
- raises total welfare if and only if users on the multi-homing side exert sufficiently
strong (positive or negative) externalities on users on the single-homing side (i.e.,
α2 < α2 or α2 > α¯2).
It follows immediately that, if α2 ∈ (α2, α¯2), collusion on the single-homing side reduces
aggregate consumer surplus (i.e. the sum of the aggregate surplus of users on each side of
the market), CSb = CSb1+CS
b
2, as users on both sides of the market are worse off. However,
when α2 /∈ (α2, α¯2), the impact on aggregate consumer surplus is no longer straightforward,
as users on the multi-homing side are better off but users on the single-homing side are
worse off. The following proposition provides a necessary and sufficient condition under
which collusion has a positive effect on aggregate consumer surplus.
Proposition 7 In the competitive bottleneck model, if platforms collude on the single-
homing side only, aggregate consumer surplus increases if users on the (collusive) single-
homing side strongly dislike the presence of users on the multi-homing side, α2 < α2 < 0.
Proof. See Appendix.
3.3 Collusion on the multi-homing side only
Last, let us study the most profitable sustainable symmetric agreement when platforms
collude on the multi-homing side (side 1) and set the price on the single-homing side (side
30
2) non-cooperatively. In this case, for a given δ ∈ (0, 1), platforms choose the price pc1b1
that solves:
max
p1
{
piAb(p1, p
A
2 , p1, p
B
2 ) + pi
Bb(p1, p
A
2 , p1, p
B
2 )
}
(30)
subject to:
pA2 = argmaxp˜2 pi
Ab
(
p1, p˜2, p1, p
B
2
)
pB2 = argmaxp˜2 pi
Bb
(
p1, p
A
2 , p1, p˜2
)
p1 ∈
{
p1 ∈ R | pi
Ab(p1,pA2 ,p1,pB2 )
1−δ ≥ max(p˜1,p˜2) piAb(p˜1, p˜2, p1, pB2 ) + δ1−δpiNb
}
.
Solving the FOCs underlying the first two constraints, we get:
pi2 =
t1t2 − α1α2
t1
− α1
t1
p1 ≡ h (p1) , i ∈ {A,B}. (31)
Thus, given the collusive price on side 1, the price on the competitive side is pc2b1 = h(p
c1b
1 ).
Lemma 10 In the competitive bottleneck model, if platforms only collude on the multi-
homing side, a change in the price on collusive side leads to a change in the price on the
competitive side as follows:
∆p2 = −α1
t1
∆p1 where ∆pj = p
c1b
j − pNbj . (32)
Again, the key determinant for the impact of one-sided collusion on prices is the exter-
nality that users on the competitive side exert on users on the collusive side, α1. Once more,
platforms set a supra-competitive price on one side of the market and an infra-competitive
price on the other if and only if users on the collusive side enjoy the presence of users on
the competitive side (i.e., α1 > 0). Otherwise, both prices are above or below the static
Nash level.
To limit the number of possible scenarios, we exclude in the rest of this section the
uninteresting scenario in which both network externalities are non-positive.
Assumption 5 α1 > 0 or α2 > 0.
The following proposition compares prices in the current regime with those under com-
petition.
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Proposition 8 In the competitive bottleneck model, if platforms collude on the multi-
homing side only, the following holds:
- If α2 > 0, prices compare to their static Nash counterparts as follows:
-
0 ↵2
↵1
pc1b1 > p
Nb
1
pc1b2 > p
Nb
2
pc1b1 > p
Nb
1
pc1b2 < p
Nb
2
pc1b1 < p
Nb
1
pc1b2 > p
Nb
2
-
0
↵1
pc1b1 < p
Nb
1
pc1b2 > p
Nb
2
1
- If α2 < 0, platforms set an infra-competitive price on the collusive side and a supra-
competitive price on the non-cooperative side (pc1b1 < p
Nb
1 and p
c1b
2 > p
Nb
2 ).
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Proof. See Appendix .
Propositions 2 and 8 are very similar and the main intuition behind the former applies
to the latter.
As in the case of collusion on the single-homing side (only), users on side 1 are harmed
by collusion on the multi-homing side (only) whenever they pay a supra-competitive price.
From Proposition 8, this is the case whenever α1 < α2.
Let us now analyze the impact of collusion on the multi-homing side (only) on users on
the single-homing side. When α2 < 0, these users are surely harmed by collusion because
they pay a higher price than under competition
(
pc1b2 > p
Nb
2
)
and also get stronger negative
externalities (as they dislike the presence of users on side 1 whose number is higher under
collusion). When α2 > 0 and α1 < 0, these users are also harmed by collusion, since they
pay a higher price
(
pc1b2 > p
Nb
2
)
and get weaker positive externalities (as they enjoy the
presence of users on side 1, whose number is lower under collusion). Finally, when α2 > 0
and α1 > 0, the impact of collusion on users on side 2 is not straightforward because either
they pay a lower price but benefit from weaker positive network externalities (if α1 < α2),
or they pay a higher price but benefit from stronger positive externalities (if α1 > α2).
However, comparing the utility of the indifferent user (located at x˜2 =
1
2
) under collusion
and competition, we find that it is always lower under collusion.34
33If α2 < 0, we must have α1 > 0 and, therefore, α1 > α2. Thus, only the rightmost region of parameters
in the line presented for the case of α2 > 0 exists.
34More precisely, replacing the expressions (70) and (70) for prices under one-sided collusion on the
multi-homing side and Nash prices (Proposition 4), in the utility function of users on side 2, given in (1),
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To complete the welfare analysis of the impact of collusion on the multi-homing side,
it remains to examine the impact of this type of collusion on total welfare. Recall that
collusion is welfare-improving if and only if it increases the number of multi-homers on side
1, which is the case if platforms charge an infra-competitive price on this side. Thus, from
Proposition 8, we know that collusion on the multi-homing side increases total welfare if
and only if α1 > α2 > 0.
Corollary 5 In the competitive bottleneck model, collusion on the multi-homing side (only):
- harms users on the single-homing side if α1 6= α2 and does not affect them if α1 = α2;
- benefits users on the multi-homing side if and only if α1 > α2;
- raises total welfare if and only if α1 > α2 > 0.
4 Discussion
4.1 Demand expansion
In our competitive bottleneck model, there is a demand expansion effect on the multi-
homing side. However, the assumptions we made do not allow for such an effect on a
side in which there is single-homing, neither in our baseline setting nor in the competitive
bottleneck model. While this feature allows us to have a tractable model and derive neat
results, it also imposes limitations. Note, however, that the striking result that, under
one-sided collusion, the price on the collusive side may be lower than the static Nash price
on that side is likely to be strengthened if we allowed for demand expansion on a single-
homing side. To see why, note that, in our setting, firms’ incentives to set a price below
the Nash level are solely driven by the incentive to soften competition on the other side.
In an environment where, following a decrease in the price on side j, there is a demand
expansion on that side and potentially also on side −j (if α−j > 0), our result is even more
likely to hold.
we obtain: uj2
(
1
2 , p
c1b
1 (δ), p
c1b
2 (δ), p
c1b
1 (δ), p
c1b
2 (δ)
)− uj2 ( 12 , pNb1 , pNb2 , pNb1 , pNb2 ) = − δΩ(α1−α2)22t1[(1−δ)(α1−α2)2+Ω] ≤ 0,
as Ω > 0 (Assumption 4i). Thus, all users on side 2 are harmed when platforms collude on the multi-homing
side whenever α1 6= α2, and are not affected by collusion if α1 = α2.
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4.2 Endogenous choice of the collusive side(s)
In our setting, platforms can always sustain some degree of collusion in equilibrium both
when they collude on the two market sides, and when they just collude on one side of the
market. Our model also suggests that platforms should always prefer to collude on both
sides (since this is the most profitable scenario). However, as mentioned before, there is
evidence of platforms being convicted of just coordinating the price on one market side.
Coordination costs and the possibility of they being (prohibitively) higher when platforms
coordinate two prices instead of one may underlie actual platforms’ choices.35 Relatedly,
platforms may engage in one-sided collusion to attempt to reduce the risk of being caught
and punished by antitrust authorities.36
In the context of one-sided collusion, a natural question that arises concerns the choice
of the collusive side. While a general treatment of this issue is outside the scope of this
paper, we provide two special cases where we are able to determine the platforms’ choice
in the baseline (single-homing) model. Collusion on side 1 yields the same outcome as
competition if α1 = t1, and the same outcome as two-sided collusion if α1 = −t1 and
δ < δm.37 Therefore, platforms (weakly) prefer to collude on side 2 in the former case
while they (weakly) prefer to collude on side 1 in the latter case. There are other reasons
outside our model that may also affect the choice of the side to collude on. For instance,
it may be harder for platforms to coordinate prices on one side of the market than on the
other one. For example, in the case of newspapers, coordinating cover prices may probably
be easier than coordinating ad prices (as the latter are likely to be more heterogeneous).
Moreover, monitoring might be easier on one side of the market than on the other one.
Considering again the newspapers example, cover prices are typically more transparent
and, therefore, easier to monitor, than ad prices.
4.3 Optimal punishment
The punishment mechanism considered in this paper (i.e., permanent reversion to Nash
competition after a deviation) is not the optimal one (Abreu, 1986). While the determi-
35One (perhaps simplistic) way of incorporating these ingredients in our model would be to introduce
a fixed coordination cost. It follows straightforwardly that: if this cost is not much higher when platforms
coordinate prices on both sides of the market than when they just coordinate one price, platforms will settle
a two-sided collusive agreement; while, if the coordination cost is larger enough under two-sided collusion,
platforms will settle a one-sided collusive agreement. For intermediate values of this coordination cost,
platforms’ choice may depend on the discount factor.
36See Charistos (2018) for an analysis of collusion between advertising-selling platforms in the presence
of an antitrust authority.
37Both results follow from Lemma 6.
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nation of the optimal mechanism is outside the scope of the paper, we believe that most,
if not all, of the main insights about the price effects of collusion would carry over to the
case where firms would use such a mechanism. First, note that the scope for perfect col-
lusion is larger with the optimal punishment mechanism than with grim trigger strategies.
Therefore, all the results in our perfect two-sided collusion and perfect one-sided collusion
scenarios not only hold, but also extend to some of the parameters under which there is
imperfect collusion in our setting. Second, consider the case of imperfect two-sided collu-
sion (under the optimal punishment mechanism) in a single-homing environment. In our
setting with grim trigger strategies, collusive prices may either be higher than the com-
petitive prices on both sides of the market or higher on one side and lower on the other
side. This result hinges on the fact that collusion increases the total price charged by the
platforms but, at the same time, distorts the price structure in a way that minimizes the
incentive to deviate (for a give total price). This mechanism would still hold with any
punishment mechanism: first, with full market coverage (under collusion), the increase in
the total price is only driven by the increase in profits and not by the specific punishment
mechansim that is considered and, second, the proof of Lemma 3 shows that there is a dis-
tortion of the price structure in a way that minimizes the deviation profit regardless of the
punishment mechanism. The only question which remains open is whether the distortion
of the price structure under the optimal mechanism can be large enough for the collusive
price to be lower than the competitive price on one of the sides, as is the case in our setting.
Third, consider the case of one-sided collusion in a single-homing environment and both
two-sided and one-sided collusion in a competitive bottleneck scenario. Note that in all
these cases, our results regarding the qualitative impact of collusion on prices would hold
under any punishment mechanism leading to the property that prices are monotonic (i.e.
there is no change in monotonicity) when the discount factor moves from 0 to the critical
level under which perfect collusion becomes sustainable.
4.4 Policy implications
Our findings have several implications regarding the detection of collusion in two-sided
markets and private damages actions by users of colluding platforms. First, a key lesson
from our analysis of one-sided collusion is that higher prices on a given side of the market
are neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for the existence of collusion on that
side. In particular, a decrease in prices on a given side should not be seen as a signal
or evidence that firms do not collude on that side. This is a novel illustration of the
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importance of accounting for the two-sided nature of a market when running an antitrust
analysis. Second, and relatedly, the computation of private damages should also account
for the peculiarities of two-sided markets. Specifically, under one-sided collusion, users on
the competitive side shoud be allowed to seek damages from the colluding platforms as
they may be harmed by their collusive behavior on the other side of the market. Third,
our analysis shows that, in the presence of positive cross-group externalities, prices on the
two sides of the market move in opposite directions under one-sided collusion while this
does not happen under two-sided collusion. This feature could be used by competition
authorities to differentiate between one-sided collusion and two-sided collusion. Relatedly,
our findings show that in a competitive bottleneck environment, the fact that a price
does not change on the multi-homing side of the market should not be interpreted by
competition authorities as indicating that firms collude on the single-homing side only. On
the contrary, such an observation should be considered as strong evidence that firms collude
on both sides of the market as it is not consistent with plaforms’ (predicted) behavior under
one-sided collusion.
5 Conclusion
We investigate collusion between two-sided platforms in a single-homing environment and
a competitive bottleneck setting. Our findings show that collusion on a given side of
the market can lead to either an increase, a decrease or no change in prices on that side
depending on (i) whether collusion occurs on the other side as well, (ii) whether there is
single-homing or multi-homing on the two sides of the market, and (iii) whether the network
externalities received by the collusive side are positive or negative, and how large they are.
One of the main takeaways of our paper is that collusion on a single side of the market
can lead to lower prices and higher user surplus on the collusive side and higher prices
and lower user surplus on the competitive side when the network externalities received
by the collusive side are positive and large enough. Another key takeaway is that it is
important to understand the effect of collusion on the price structure as this can explain
counterintuitive behaviors of colluding platforms.
We believe that our results can help antitrust authorities understand better the changes
in pricing behavior that are consistent with one-sided and two-sided collusion between
platforms. They can also be useful to judges who need to decide who was harmed by a
cartel involving platforms in private damages cases.
Finally, our results also provide interesting insights into the effects of collusion on prices
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in a multi-product setting with demand linkages. When the parameters capturing cross-
group externalities in our model are positive, the latter can be reinterpreted as a model
in which two firms selling two complementary products compete against each other. Our
results show in particular that single-product collusion in such an environment can lead to
a decrease in the price of the product for which there is collusion and an increase in the
price of the product for which there is competition.
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Appendix
Proof of Lemma 2.
(i) Note first that, for any δ ∈ (0, 1], ICC (4) can be rewritten as:
1
δ
[
pid (p1, p2)− pi (p1, p2)
] ≤ pid (p1, p2)− piN .
Let (0, δm) and consider (pc1 (δ) , p
c
2 (δ)) ∈ I (δ) such that pi (pc1 (δ) , pc2 (δ)) = pic(δ).
Assume by way of contradiction that (pc1 (δ) , p
c
2 (δ)) /∈ I¯ (δ). Then
1
δ
[
pid (pc1 (δ) , p
c
2 (δ))− pi (pc1 (δ) , pc2 (δ))
]
< pid (pc1 (δ) , p
c
2 (δ))− piN ,
i.e., the constraint is not binding at the optimum. Then, by a (standard) continuity
argument, there exists  > 0 such that
1
δ
[
pid (p1, p2)− pi (p1, p2)
]
< pid (p1, p2)− piN
for any (p1, p2) ∈ [pc1 (δ)− , pc1 (δ) + ] × [pc2 (δ)− , pc2 (δ) + ]. This implies that the pair
of prices (pc1(δ), p
c
2(δ)) is a local maximum of pi (p1, p2). However, straightforward compu-
tations show that pi (p1, p2) does not have a local maximum but its global maximum, which
is uniquely reached at (pm1 , p
m
2 ). This implies that (p
c
1 (δ) , p
c
2 (δ)) = (p
m
1 , p
m
2 ), which in turn
implies that
1
δ
[
pid (pm1 , p
m
2 )− pi (pm1 , pm2 )
]
< pid (pm1 , p
m
2 )− piN
or, equivalently,
δ >
pid (pm1 , p
m
2 )− pi (pm1 , pm2 )
pid (pm1 , p
m
2 )− piN
= δm,
which leads to a contradiction. Thus, it must hold that (pc1 (δ) , p
c
2 (δ)) ∈ I¯ (δ).
(ii) From the ICC
1
δ
[
pid (p1, p2)− pi (p1, p2)
] ≤ pid (p1, p2)− piN
and the fact that pid (p1, p2) − pi (p1, p2) ≥ 0 it follows that δ < δ′ ⇒ I (δ) ⊆ I (δ′) ⇒
pic (δ) ≤ pic (δ′). Moreover, for δ, δ′ such that 0 < δ < δ′ ≤ δm, it must hold that pic (δ) 6=
pic (δ′). To see why, assume by way of contradiction that pic (δ) = pic (δ′) and consider
(pc1 (δ) , p
c
2 (δ)) ∈ I (δ) such that pi (pc1 (δ) , pc2 (δ)) = pic(δ). Since I (δ) ⊆ I (δ′), we have
38
(pc1 (δ) , p
c
2 (δ)) ∈ I (δ′). This, combined with pi (pc1 (δ) , pc2 (δ)) = pic (δ′) and (i), implies that
(pc1 (δ) , p
c
2 (δ)) ∈ I¯ ′ (δ), i.e.
1
δ′
[
pid (pc1 (δ) , p
c
2 (δ))− pi (pc1 (δ) , pc2 (δ))
]
= pid (pc1 (δ) , p
c
2 (δ))− piN
which can be rewritten as
δ′ =
pid (pc1 (δ) , p
c
2 (δ))− pi (pc1 (δ) , pc2 (δ))
pid (pc1 (δ) , p
c
2 (δ))− piN
because (pc1 (δ) , p
c
2 (δ)) 6=
(
pN1 , p
N
2
)
(this follows from the fact that
(
pN1 , p
N
2
)
/∈ I¯ (δ) for
δ > 0 and (i)). Since (pc1 (δ) , p
c
2 (δ)) ∈ I¯ (δ) (from (i)), we also have
δ =
pid (pc1 (δ) , p
c
2 (δ))− pi (pc1 (δ) , pc2 (δ))
pid (pc1 (δ) , p
c
2 (δ))− piN
.
Therefore, δ = δ′, which leads to a contradiction, which completes the proof.
Proof of Lemma 3.
Assume, by way of contradiction, that (pc1 (δ) , p
c
2 (δ)) is not a solution to the constrained
minimization program. Denoting (pˆ1 (δ) , pˆ2 (δ)) a solution to that program, we then have
pid (pˆ1 (δ) , pˆ2 (δ)) < pi
d (pc1 (δ) , p
c
2 (δ)) .
Therefore
pi (pˆ1 (δ) , pˆ2 (δ))
1− δ =
pi (pc1 (δ) , p
c
2 (δ))
1− δ =
= pid (pc1 (δ) , p
c
2 (δ)) +
δ
1− δpi
N > pid (pˆ1 (δ) , pˆ2 (δ)) +
δ
1− δpi
N ,
which implies that
1
δ
[
pid (pˆ1 (δ) , pˆ2 (δ))− pi (pˆ1 (δ) , pˆ2 (δ))
]
< pid (pˆ1 (δ) , pˆ2 (δ))− piN .
Again, by a continuity argument, there exists µ > 0 such that
1
δ
[
pid (p1, p2)− pi (p1, p2)
]
< pid (p1, p2)− piN
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for any (p1, p2) ∈ [pˆ1 (δ)− µ, pˆ1 (δ) + µ] × [pˆ2 (δ)− µ, pˆ2 (δ) + µ]. There are only two pos-
sible scenarios, which both lead to a contradiction:
- If pi (p1, p2) reaches a local maximum at (pˆ1 (δ) , pˆ2 (δ)) then it is necessarily the case
that (pˆ1 (δ) , pˆ2 (δ)) = (p
m
1 , p
m
2 ), and, therefore, pi (pˆ1 (δ) , pˆ2 (δ)) = pi
m > pic (δ) because
δ ∈ (0, δm), a contradiction.
- If pi (p1, p2) does not reach a local maximum at (pˆ1 (δ) , pˆ2 (δ)) then there exists
(p˘1, p˘2) ∈ [pˆ1 (δ)− µ, pˆ1 (δ) + µ]× [pˆ2 (δ)− µ, pˆ2 (δ) + µ] such that
pi (p˘1, p˘2) > pi (pˆ1 (δ) , pˆ2 (δ)) = pi
c (δ)
Since (p˘1, p˘2) ∈ I(δ), this contradicts the fact that pic (δ) = max
(p1,p2)∈I(δ)
pi (p1, p2). 
Proof of Lemma 4.
We are focusing on symmetric collusive agreements, i.e., such that platforms set the same
price on each side of the market, i.e., pAj = p
B
j = pj, j ∈ {1, 2}. Let x˜j denote the consumer
on side j that is indifferent between joining platform A and not joining any platform.
1. We start by deriving the conditions that ensure that, if platforms fully serve side 2 (i.e.,
x˜2 =
1
2
), it is also profitable to fully serve side 1.
Given that x˜2 =
1
2
and platforms set symmetric prices, the user on side 1 that is indifferent
between joining platform A and not joining any platform is such that:
uA1 (x˜1, p1, p2, p1, p2) = 0 ⇔ x˜1 =
2k1 − 2p1 + α1
2t1
. (33)
If side 1 is not fully covered, i.e. x˜1 ≤ 12 , the individual (collusive) profit is:
pic(p1, p2) = p1x˜1 +
p2
2
= p1
2k1 − 2p1 + α1
2t1
+
p2
2
. (34)
As pic is strictly increasing in p2, platforms will choose the highest price that leaves the
consumer that is indifferent between joining platforms A and B, x˜2 =
1
2
, with zero utility:
uA2 (
1
2
, p1, p2, p1, p2) = 0 ⇔ p2 = k2 + α2 2k1 − 2p1 + α1
2t1
− t2
2
. (35)
Solving the FOC corresponding to the maximization of pic with respect to p1,
∂pic
∂p1
= 0, we
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obtain:
p1 =
2k1 + α1
4
Replacing this expression in (35) and (33), we obtain respectively:
p2 =
4k2t1 − 2t1t2 + 2k1α2 + α1α2
4t1
and:
x˜1 =
2k1 + α1
4t1
.
As a result, there is a local maximum of pic with partial coverage of side 1 if:
x˜1 <
1
2
⇔ k1 < t1 − α1
2
.
Notice that we could replicate this analysis assuming that platforms fully serve side 1 (i.e.,
x˜1 =
1
2
), and derive the condition that ensures that it is also profitable to fully serve side
2. Similarly, we would conclude that there is a local maximum of pic with partial coverage
of side 2 if:
k2 < t2 − α2
2
.
2. Let us now see under which conditions platforms prefer to partially serve both sides, i.e.
x˜1 <
1
2
and x˜2 <
1
2
, instead of fully serving them.
If platforms set symmetric prices, the user on side j ∈ {1, 2} that is indifferent between
joining platform A and not joining any platform is such that:
uAj (x˜j, p1, p2, p1, p2) = 0 ⇔ kj + αjx˜−j − tjx˜j − pj = 0.
Solving the corresponding system of two equations, we obtain:{
uA1 (x˜1, p1, p2, p1, p2) = 0
uA2 (x˜2, p1, p2, p1, p2) = 0
⇔
{
x˜1 =
α1(k2−p2)+t2(k1−p1)
t1t2−α1α2
x˜2 =
α2(k1−p1)+t1(k2−p2)
t1t2−α1α2 .
If x˜j ≤ 12 , the individual collusive profit is given by:
pic = p1x˜1 + p2x˜2.
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Solving the FOCs corresponding to the maximization of pic, we obtain:
p1 =
k2t1(α1 − α2) + k1 (2t1t2 − α1α2 − α22)
4t1t2 − (α1 + α2)2 ∧ p2 =
k1t2(α2 − α1) + k2 (2t1t2 − α1α2 − α21)
4t1t2 − (α1 + α2)2 .
Given these prices:
x˜j =
2t−jkj + (α1 + α2)k−j
4t1t2 − (α1 + α2)2 .
Thus, there is an interior local maximum with partial coverage of both market sides iff:
x˜j <
1
2
⇔ 2t−jkj + (α1 + α2)k−j < 4t1t2 − (α1 + α2)
2
2
Thus, for the two platforms to prefer to fully cover the two market sides, we must have:
min
{
2t2k1 + (α1 + α2)k2, (α1 + α2)k1 + 2t1k2
} ≥ 4t1t2 − (α1 + α2)2
2
.

Proof of Lemma 5.
Assume, w.l.o.g., that platform A deviates from the collusive agreement, i.e., sets prices
that maximize its individual profit, given that platform B charges the collusive prices
(pc1, p
c
2). Its profit function is then:
piA =
−t2(p1)2 − t1(p2)2 − p1p2(α1 + α2) + p1(t2pc1 + α1pc2 + t1t2 − α1α2) + p2(α2pc1 + t1pc2 + t1t2 − α1α2)
2(t1t2 − α1α2) .
(36)
The FOCs corresponding to the maximization of piA are:
∂piA
∂pj
= 0⇔ 1
2
− 2t−jpj + (α1 + α2)p−j − t−jp
c
j − αjpc−j
2(t1t2 − α1α2) = 0, j ∈ {1, 2}.
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Combining the two FOCs, we obtain:38
pdj (p
c
1, p
c
2) =
[2t1t2 − α−j(α1 + α2)]pcj + pc−jtj(αj − α−j) + (2tj − α1 − α2)(t1t2 − α1α2)
4t1t2 − (α1 + α2)2 .
(37)
Replacing these prices in (36), we obtain the deviation profit (for given pc1 and p
c
2):
pid(pc1, p
c
2) =
1
2 [4t1t2 − (α1 + α2)2]
{
t2(p
c
1)
2 + t1(p
c
2)
2 + (α1 + α2)p
c
1p
c
2 + [t2(2t1 − α1 + α2)− α2(α1 + α2)] pc1+
+ [t1(2t2 + α1 − α2)− α1(α1 + α2)] pc2 + (t1 + t2 − α1 − α2)(t1t2 − α1α2)
}
.
(38)
From Lemma 4, both sides of the market are fully covered under the most profitable
collusive agreement. Thus, if platforms charge prices (p1, p2), their individual per-period
collusive profit is:
pic(p1, p2) =
p1 + p2
2
. (39)
From Lemma 3, collusive prices (pc1, p
c
2) solve the following constrained minimization pro-
gram:
min
(p1,p2)∈R2
pid (p1, p2) s.t. pi
c =
p1 + p2
2
.
For a given collusive profit pic, replacing pc2 = 2pi
c − pc1 in (38) and solving the FOC
corresponding to the minimization of pid (p1, 2pi
c − p1) with respect to p1, we obtain:39
pc1 =
α1 − α2
2
+
2t1 − α1 − α2
t1 + t2 − α1 − α2pi
c.
Thus, if δ is sufficiently low, collusive prices are:
(pc1 (δ) , p
c
2 (δ)) =
(
α1 − α2
2
+
2t1 − α1 − α2
t1 + t2 − α1 − α2pi
c(δ),
α2 − α1
2
+
2t2 − α1 − α2
t1 + t2 − α1 − α2pi
c(δ)
)
.
(40)
38Assumption 1 implies that the second-order conditions are satisfied: ∂
2pid
∂(pdj )
2 = − t2t1t2−α1α2 < 0 and
∂2pid
∂(pd1)
2
∂2pid
∂(pd2)
2 −
(
∂2pid
∂pd1∂p
d
2
)2
= 4t1t2−(α1+α2)
2
4(t1t2−α1α2)2 > 0.
39The second-order is satisfied, d
2pid
dpc1
2 (pc1, 2pi
c − pc1) = t1+t2−α1−α24t1t2−(α1+α2)2 > 0, meaning that our candidate is,
indeed, a minimum.
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These prices are valid as long as they induce full coverage of side j ∈ {1, 2}, i.e., :
uij
(
1
2
, pc1, p
c
2, p
c
1, p
c
2
) ≥ 0 ⇔ (2tj − α1 − α2)pic(δ) ≤ (2kj − tj + α−j)piN . (41)
1. If t1 >
α1+α2
2
and t2 >
α1+α2
2
, collusive prices are increasing in δ on both sides of the
market. In this case, we can rewrite condition (41) for full coverage of side j as follows:
pic(δ) <
(2kj − tj + α−j)piN
2tj − α1 − α2 ≡ p˜ij.
Combining Lemma 2 with pic (0) = piN and the continuity of pic (δ), we conclude that, as
long as p˜ij ∈
(
piN , pim
)
, ∃δ˜j ∈ (0, 1) such that pic(δ) ≤ p˜ij,∀δ ≤ δ˜j. For pic(δ) > p˜ij, the
price on side j is no longer given by (40). We need, therefore, to know in which side of the
market the collusive price reaches its maximum for a lower value of δ. Note that:
p˜i1 < p˜i2 ⇔ k2(2t1 − α1 − α2)− k1(2t2 − α1 − α2) > piN(α2 − α1).
1.1. If k2(2t1 − α1 − α2) − k1(2t2 − α1 − α2) < piN(α2 − α1), the collusive price on side
1 reaches its maximum level (i.e., that ensures full coverage of this side) for lower values
of δ. Thus, expressions (40) are valid for δ < δ˜1. For δ > δ˜1, we have that p
c
1 = p
m
1 and,
therefore, pc2 = pi
c − pm1 . Again, the price on side 2 can not exceed the level that ensures
full coverage of this side, pm2 . Thus, ∃δm ∈ (δ˜1, 1) such that pc2 = pm2 , for δ ≥ δm.
1.2. If k2(2t1−α1−α2)− k1(2t2−α1−α2) > piN(α2−α1), the price on side 2 reaches its
maximum level, pm2 , for lower values of δ. Thus, expressions (40) are only valid for δ < δ˜2.
For δ > δ˜2, we have that p
c
2 = p
m
2 and p
c
1 = pi
c − pm2 . The price on side 1 must be lower
than pm1 , to ensure full coverage of this side. Thus, ∃δm ∈ (δ˜2, 1) such that pc1 = pm1 , for
δ ≥ δm.
2. If t1 <
α1+α2
2
< t2, using (40), we conclude that, for sufficiently low values of δ, p
c
1 is
decreasing in δ and pc2 is increasing in δ. Thus, the maximum level for the collusive price
will be achieved on side 2 for lower values of the discount factor. The analysis is then
similar to case 1.2.
3. If t2 <
α1+α2
2
< t1, for low enough values of δ, p
c
1 is increasing in δ while p
c
2 is decreasing
in δ. Thus, the maximum level for the collusive price will be achieved on side 1 for lower
values of the discount factor, and the analysis is similar to case 1.1. 
Proof of Proposition 1.
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If t2 > (α1 + α2) /2 then p
c
2(δ) is increasing in δ as long as p
c
2(δ) < p
m
2 , and then is constant.
This implies that pc2(δ) > p
c
2(0) = p
N
2 for any δ ∈ (0, 1]. Likewise, if t1 > (α1 + α2) /2 then
pc1(δ) > p
N
1 for any δ ∈ (0, 1]. Consider now the scenario in which t2 < (α1 + α2) /2. In
this case, pc2(δ) is decreasing over (0, δ˜1), which implies that p
c
2(δ) < p
N
2 for any δ ∈ (0, δ˜1).
Moreover, pc2(δ) is increasing over
[
δ˜1, δ
m
]
and pc2(δ˜1) < p
N
2 < p
m
2 = p
c
2(δ
m), which implies
the existence of δˆ2 ∈ (δ˜1, δm) such that pc2(δ) < pN2 for any δ ∈ (0, δˆ2) and pc2(δ) > pN2 for
any δ ∈ (δˆ2, δm]. Finally, note that pc2(δ) = pm2 > pN2 for any δ ∈ (δm, 1]. Therefore, pc2(δ) <
pN2 for any δ ∈ (0, δˆ2) and pc2(δ) > pN2 for any δ ∈ (δ˜2, 1]. Likewise, if t1 < (α1 + α2) /2,
then there exists δˆ1 ∈ (δ˜2, δm) such that pc1(δ) < pN1 for any δ ∈ (0, δˆ1) and pc1(δ) > pN1 for
any δ ∈ (δ˜1, 1]. 
Proof of Lemma 7.
Let (poc1 , p
oc
2 ) denote the (unique) solution of the maximisation program (11) suubject to
(12). From (13), we know that poc2 = g(p
oc
1 , α1, α2) =
t1t2−α1α2
t1
− α1
t1
poc1 . In what follows, we
will analyse separately three scenarios, divided according to the value of α1.
If platforms set poc1 and p
oc
2 inducing full market coverage, their individual profit is:
pioc =
poc1 + p
oc
2
2
=
poc1 +
(
t1t2−α1α2
t1
− α1
t1
poc1
)
2
=
t1t2 − α1α2
2t1
+
t1 − α1
2t1
poc1 . (42)
1. 0 ≤ α1 < t1.
In this case, pioc given in (42) is increasing on poc1 . Thus, platforms will set a supra-
competitive price on side 1 and an infra-competitive price on side 2 (as α1 < 0). It follows,
therefore, that if side 1 is fully covered, the condition for side 2 to be fully covered under
Nash competition (Assumption 1) implies that side 2 is also fully covered under one-sided
collusion. As platforms charge symmetric prices, they equally share both sides of the
market. Thus, side 1 is fully covered if and only if the indifferent consumer, located at
x = 1
2
, gets a non-negative utility:
ui1
(
1
2
, poc1 , p
oc
2 , p
oc
1 , p
oc
2
)
≥ 0 ⇔ poc1 ≤ k1 +
α1 − t1
2
= pm1 , (43)
where pm1 is the maximum price that platforms can charge on side 1 for this side to be fully
covered, as seen in (6).
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Solving (42) with respect to poc1 , we obtain that, for a given collusive profit pi
oc(δ), the price
on side 1 is:
poc1 (δ) =
2t1
t1 − α1pi
oc(δ)− t1t2 − α1α2
t1 − α1 . (44)
Replacing this expression in (13), we obtain the price on side 2:
poc2 (δ) =
t1t2 − α1α2
t1 − α1 −
α1
t1 − α1pi
oc(δ), (45)
Replacing (44) in the condition for full coverage of side 1, (43), we obtain:
poc1 (δ) ≤ pm1 ⇔ pioc(δ) ≤
2k1(t1 − α1)− (t1 − α1)2 + 2(t1t2 − α1α2)
4t1
≡ p˜iom. (46)
Let δ˜om be the value for the discount factor for which the most sustainable collusive profit
coincides with p˜iom, i.e., pioc(δ˜om) = p˜iom. If δ ≤ δ˜om, the prices are given by (44) and (45).
If δ > δ˜om:
poc1 (δ) = p
m
1 and p
oc
2 (δ) =
t1t2 − α1α2
t1
− α1
t1
pm1 =
t1(α1 + 2t2)− α1(α1 + 2α2 + 2k1)
2t1
.
2. α1 > t1
In this case, pioc given in (42) is decreasing in poc1 . Thus, p
oc
1 ≤ pN1 . As poc2 = g(poc1 , α1, α2) =
t1t2−α1α2
t1
− α1
t1
poc1 and p
N
2 = g(p
N
1 , α1, α2), we conclude that p
oc
2 ≥ pN2 . Thus, if side 2 is fully
covered, the condition for full coverage under Nash competition (Assumption 1) ensures
that side 1 is also fully covered under one-sided collusion (as poc1 ≤ pN1 ). As platforms set
symmetric prices, side 2 is fully covered if and only if:
ui2
(
1
2
, poc1 , p
oc
2 , p
oc
1 , p
oc
2
)
≥ 0 ⇔ u˜N2 +
α1
t1
(poc1 − pN1 ) ≥ 0 ⇔ poc1 ≥ pN1 −
t1
α1
u˜N2 ≡ pˆ1,
(47)
where:
u˜N2 = k2 −
3t2 − 2α1 − α2
2
(48)
is the utility of the indifferent consumer on side 2 under Nash competition. Using (44), we
can rewrite the previous inequality as follows:
pioc(δ) ≤ (α1 − t1)(2k2 + α2 − t2) + 2(t1t2 − α1α2)
4α1
≡ pˆioc (49)
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Let δˆom be the value for the discount factor for which the most sustainable collusive profit
coincides with pˆiom, i.e., pioc(δˆom) = pˆiom. If δ ≤ δˆom, the prices are given by (44) and (45).
If δ > δˆom:
poc1 (δ) = p
N
1 −
t1
α1
u˜N2 and p
oc
2 (δ) = p
m
2 .
3. α1 < 0
In this case, pioc given in (42) is increasing in poc1 . Thus, p
oc
1 > p
N
1 for δ > 0. From Lemma
6, we also conclude that poc2 > p
N
2 .
The expressions for prices, (44) and (45), are valid as long as consumers located at x = 1
2
on each market side get positive utility. Thus, side 2 is fully covered if and only if:
ui2
(
1
2
, poc1 , p
oc
2 , p
oc
1 , p
oc
2
)
≥ 0 ⇔ poc1 (δ) ≤ pˆ1,
where pˆ1 is given in (47). Thus, side 1 is fully covered if p
oc
1 ≤ pm1 , given in (6), and side 2
is fully covered if poc1 ≤ pˆ1. Furthermore:
pm1 < pˆ1 ⇔ α1 > −
u˜N2
u˜N1
t1.
Hence:
- If − u˜N2
u˜N1
t1 ≤ α1 < 0, given δ, the most collusive prices are given by (16).
- If α1 < − u˜
N
2
u˜N1
t1, given δ, the most collusive prices are given by (17).

Proof of Lemma 8.
Looking at the expression for total welfare when platforms set symmetric prices, (24), it
follows that it is quadratic in nb1 and globally concave. In addition, total welfare would be
maximized at:
dW b
dnb1
= 0 ⇔ n∗b1 =
2k1 + α1 + α2
2t1
.
As, under Assumption 4ii, n∗b1 > 1, it follows that W
b is strictly increasing ∀nb1 ∈ (0, 1).

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Proof of Proposition 5.
If platforms set symmetric prices, pA1 = p
B
1 = p
cb
1 and p
A
2 = p
B
2 = p
cb
2 , their individual profit
is:
picb(pcb1 , p
cb
2 ) =
α1 + 2k1
2t1
pcb1 −
(pcb1 )
2
t1
+
pcb2
2
.
Suppose, without loss of generality, that platform A unilaterally deviates from the collusive
agreement by choosing prices p1 and p2 that maximize its individual profit (while platform
B is setting prices pcb1 and p
cb
2 ). Then, its profit is:
piA(p1, p2; p
cb
1 , p
cb
2 ) =
1
8t1(t1t2 − α1α2)
{
− 4(2t1t2 − α1α2)p12 (50)
+
[−α1α22 + (α1 + 2k1)(4t1t2 − 3α1α2)− 4t1(α1 + α2)p2 + 4α1t1pcb2 ] p1
− t1
[
4t1p2 − 4t1(pcb2 + t2)− α2(2k1 − 3α1 − α2)
]
p2
}
.
Solving the corresponding FOCs, we obtain the following deviation prices (for given collu-
sive prices):
pdb1 (p
cb
1 , p
cb
2 ) =
α2(α1 − α2)
Ω
pcb1 +
t1(α1 − α2)
Ω
pcb2 +
(4k1 + α1 − α2)(t1t2 − α1α2)
Ω
pdb2 (p
cb
1 , p
cb
2 ) =
(4t1t2 − α21 − 3α1α2)
t1Ω
(α2p
c
1 + t1p
c
2)
+
(t1t2 − α1α2) [4t1t2 − α21 − 3α1α2 − 2k1(α1 + α2)]
t1Ω
Replacing these expressions in (50), we obtain the maximum deviation profit (for given pcb1
and pcb2 ):
picb(pcb1 , p
cb
2 ) =
1
t1Ω
[
t21(p
c
2)
2 + t1(2t1t2 + k1α1 − k1α2 − 2α1α2)pc2 + α22(pc1)2
+ α2(2t1t2 + k1α1 − k1α2 − 2α1α2)pc1 + 2α2t1pc1pc2
+ (t1t2 − α1α2)
(
2k1
2 + t1t2 + k1α1 − k1α2 − α1α2
) ]
(51)
It is straightforward to see that Lemma 3 still applies and allows us to determine the price
structure under the most profitable sustainable (two-sided) collusive agreement. Thus, pcb1
and pcb2 are those that minimize the deviation profit, pi
db. Thus, for a given collusive profit
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picb(pcb1 , p
cb
2 ) = pi, the collusive prices solve the following constrained minimisation problem:
min
(pcb1 ,p
cb
2 )
pidb(pcb1 , p
cb
2 ) s.t. pi
cb(pcb1 , p
cb
2 ) = pi,
whose Lagrangean function is:
L(pcb1 , pcb2 , λ) = pidb(pcb1 , pcb2 ) + λ
[
picb(pcb1 , p
cb
2 )− pi
]
.
Solving the corresponding FOCs, we obtain 3 candidates to constrained minimum but just
the following one satisfies the SOCs:
pcb1 = p
N
1 , p
cb
2 = 2pi −
(2k1 + α1 − α2)(2k1 + α1 + α2)
8t1
, λ =
1
2
+
8t1pi − 2k12
Ω
. (52)
Replacing these expressions in (51), we obtain the deviation profit, for a given collusive
profit pi:
pidb(pi) =
16k41 − 8k12(16t1pi − Ω) + (16t1pi + Ω)2
64t1Ω
.
The (collusive) profit pi ≥ piN is sustainable iff the following ICC is satisfied:
pi
1− δ ≥ pi
db(pi) +
δ
1− δpi
Nb ⇔
pi − piNb
4(1− δ)Ω
[
(3δ + 1)Ω + 4(1− δ)k12 − 16t1(1− δ)pi
] ≥ 0 ⇔ pi ≤ 1
4t1
[
k1
2 +
1 + 3δ
4(1− δ)Ω
]
.
Thus, given δ, the most profitable collusive profit is:
picb(δ) =
1
4t1
[
k1
2 +
1 + 3δ
4(1− δ)Ω
]
. (53)
Replacing this expression in (53), we obtain the collusive prices:
pcb1 = p
N
1 and p
cb
2 (δ) = p
N
2 +
Ω
2t1
δ
1− δ (54)
Notice, however, that the above expressions are only valid if the market is fully covered
and there is partial multi-homing on side 1. As pcb1 = p
N
1 and the number of users on side
2 is the same under collusion and competition, the conditions for market coverage and
partial multi-homing on side 1 are the same as under Nash competition (Assumption 4).
As a result, we only need to check that side 2 is fully covered, i.e., that the utility of the
consumer located at x = 1
2
is non-negative. Replacing the collusive prices in [!!!!!!!! (1)],
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we get:
ui2
(
1
2
, pcb1 , p
cb
2 (δ), p
cb
1 , p
cb
2 (δ)
)
≥ 0
⇔ δ ≤ 1− 2Ω
2k1(α1 + α2) + 4k2t1 + 2(t1t2 − α1α2) + Ω ≡ δ
mB.
Thus, expressions (53) and (54) are only valid for δ ≤ δmB. For δmb < δ < 1, we have
pcb1 = p
N
1 , p
cb
2 (δ) = p
cb
2 (δ
mb) and picb(δ) = picb(δmb). 
Proof of Proposition 6.
1. (Perfect collusion) Start by assuming that platforms are sufficiently patient for the
ICC in (27) to be not binding. In this case, platforms set the price on side 2 that maximises
their joint profit, which we denote by pm2b2 . Replacing p
A
1 = p
B
1 = f (p2), given in (31), in
the platforms’ joint profit, (30), we get:
piJ(p2) =
1
t1(4t1t2 − 3α1α2)2
{
− 2α22t21p22 − 2t1
[
α1α
2
2k1 − 4(t1t2 − α1α2)(2t1t2 − α1α2)
]
p2
+ (2k1 + α1)
2(t1t2 − α1α2)(2t1t2 − α1α2)
}
. (55)
As d
2piJ
dp22
= − 4α22t1
(4t1t2−3α1α2)2 < 0,∀p2, it follows that piJ is globally concave. As a result, the
maximiser of piJ , pm2b2 , is above the Nash level, p
Nb
2 , iff:
40
dpiJ
dp2
∣∣∣∣
p2=pNb2
> 0⇔ Γ > 0. (56)
In the LHS of the last inequality we have a second-order polynomial in α2 whose roots are:
α¯2 =
1
2
(
−3α1 +
√
9α21 + 16t1t2
)
and α2 =
1
2
(
−3α1 −
√
9α21 + 16t1t2
)
. (57)
It is straightforward to show that α2 < 0 < α¯2. Thus:
pm2b2 > p
Nb
2 ⇔ α2 ∈]α2, α¯2[. (58)
Combining this with (29), we get the comparison between the price on side 1 under collusion
and competition.
40Please note that the parameter Γ = 4t1t2 − 3α1α2 − α22 was defined in section 3.2.
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Let us determine the critical discount factor, i.e., the value for δ above which the ICC
is not binding. Solving the FOC corresponding to the maximization of (55), we get:
pm2b2 = −
α1(k1 − 4α1)
2t1
+
4t1t
2
2
α22
− 6α1t2
α2
. (59)
Replacing in (55), we get the individual (perfect) collusive profit:
pim2b = piNb +
Γ2
16α22t1
(60)
where piNb is given in Proposition 4 and Γ is defined in section 3.2. Solving the FOCs
corresponding to the individual profit maximization if the rival firm abides by the collusive
agreement, we can obtain the unilateral deviation profit:
pidm2b = pim2b2 +
(t1t2 − α1α2)(2t1t2 − α1α2)(4t1t2 − α2(3α1 + α2))2
2α42t1Ω
.
Thus, the critical discount factor is:
δm2b =
pidm2b − pim2b
pidm2b − piNb = 1−
α22Ω
α22Ω + 8(t1t2 − α1α2)(2t1t2 − α1α2)
. (61)
2. (Imperfect collusion) Consider now that platforms are little patient and, therefore
the ICC in (27) binds. As a result, that the collusive price on side 2, pc2b2 , is the solution
of:
piJ(p2)
2
− (1− δ)pid2b(p2)− δΠN = 0, (62)
where piJ is given by (55) and pid2b(p2) is the maximum profit that a platform can obtain
by unilaterally deviating from the agreement, while the rival sets prices p1 = f(p2) and p2.
To compute pid2b(p2), suppose, without loss of generality, that platform A deviates from
the collusive agreement, while platform B sets the collusive price on side 2, pc2b2 , and the
corresponding competitive price on side 1, pc2b1 = f(p
c2b
2 ). More precisely, platform A fix
prices pd2b1 and p
d2b
2 that maximize its individual profit:
max
p1,p2
piAb
(
p1, p2, f(p
c2b
2 ), p
c2b
2
)
.
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Solving the corresponding FOCs, we obtain:
pd2b1 (p
c2b
2 ) =
1
Ω(4t1t2 − 3α1α2)
{
2k1(t1t2 − α1α2)
(
8t1t2 − 5α1α2 − α22
)
+ 2(α1 − α2)(t1t2 − α1α2)(2t1t2 − α1α2) + t1(α1 − α2)
(
4t1t2 − 3α1α2 − α22
)
pcb22
}
and
pd2b2 (p
c2b
2 ) =
1
Ω(4t1t2 − 3α1α2)t1
{
2(t1t2 − α1α2)(2t1t2 − α1α2)
(
4t1t2 − α21 − 3α1α2 − 2α1k1
)
+ t1
(
4t1t2 − 3α1α2 − α21
) (
4t1t2 − 3α1α2 − α22
)
pc2b2
}
.
Replacing these expressions in piAb
(
p1, p2, f(p
c2b
2 ), p
c2b
2
)
, we get pid2b(p2). After plugging this
expression in (62), we obtain an equation in p2, whose solution (besides p2 = p
Nb
2 ) is:
pc2b2 (δ) =
1
4t1 (Λ− Γ2δ)
{
Λ [4t1t2 − α1(α1 + 3α2 + 2k1)]
+ Γ
[
2α1k1Γ + α1α2
(
3α21 + 26α1α2 + 3α
2
2
)
+ 4t1t2
(
12t1t2 − 18α1α2 − α21 − α22
) ]
δ
}
(63)
where Γ ≡ 4t1t2 − 3α1α2 − α22 and Λ ≡ 8(t1t2 − α1α2)(2t1t2 − α1α2) > 0. Differentiating
this expression with respect to δ, we obtain:41
dpc2b2
dδ
> 0⇔ ΓΛΩ (Γ + α
2
2)
2t1 (Λ− Γ2δ)2
> 0⇔ Γ > 0,
which is exactly the same condition as the one we obtained for perfect collusion, (56). As
pc2b2 (0) = p
Nb
2 , platforms will set a supra-competitive price on the collusive side (side 2)
iff Γ > 0, which, as seen above, is true iff α2 ∈]α2, α¯2[. The comparison for p1 follows
combining this result with (29).

Proof of Proposition 7.
If α2 ∈ (α2, α¯2), collusion on the single-homing side damages aggregate consumer surplus,
CSb = CSb1 + CS
b
2, as consumer surplus on both sides of the market decreases.
Consider now that α2 /∈ (α2, α¯2). Let us focus on the scenarios where platforms set
41Notice that Γ + α22 = 3(t1t2 − α1α2) + t1t2 > 0.
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symmetric prices (pAj = p
B
j = pj). Replacing expression (19) in (22) and (23) and adding
up the obtained expressions, we get:
CSb(p1, p2) =
(α1 + 2k1 − 2p1)(α1 + 2α2 + 2k1 − 2p1) + t1(4k2 − 4p2 − t2)
4t1
For price combinations that satisfy the FOCs on the competitive side, (31), we get:
C˜Sb(p2) =
[(α1 + 2k1)(2t1t2 − α1α2) + 2α2t1p2]
[
(α1 + 4α2 + 2k1)(2t1t2 − α1α2)− 2α1α22 + 2α2t1p2
]
4t1(4t1t2 − 3α1α2)2 +k2−p2−
t2
4
which is a globally concave function in p2, as it is a quadratic function with coefficient
α22t1
(4t1t2−3α1α2)2 > 0 in p
2
2. Differentiating C˜S
b
with respect to p2, we obtain:
∂C˜S
b
∂p2
=
2α2t1t2(13α1 + 2α2 + 2k1)− α1α22(10α1 + 3α2 + 2k1)− 16t21t22 + 2α22p2t1
(4t1t2 − 3α1α2)2
Evaluating this derivative at the Nash price, given in Lemma 1, we obtain:
∂C˜S
b
∂p2
∣∣∣∣∣
p2=pNb2
< 0 ⇔ 2α2k1 < (α1 + α2)(α1 − 2α2) + Ω. (64)
• If α2 < α2 < 0, this condition is trivially satisfied (recall that, by assumption 4,
Ω > 0). Thus, pNb2 is at the decreasing branch of C˜S
b
. As, from Proposition 6,
pc2b2 < p
Nb
2 , we conclude that aggregate surplus is greater when platforms only collude
on single-homing side than under Nash competition.
• If α2 > α¯2, we can rewrite (64) as follows:
∂C˜S
b
∂p2
∣∣∣∣∣
p2=pNb2
< 0 ⇔ 2k1 < 8t1t2 − 7α1α2 − 3α
2
2
α2
.
Let us show that, if α2 > α¯2, the expression in the RHS is negative and, therefore,
the inequality is never satisfied. As α2 > 0, this turns out to prove that f(α2) =
8t1t2 − 7α1α2 − 3α22 < 0:
α2 <
−
√
49α21 + 96t1t2 − 7α1
6
≡
˜
α2 ∨ α2 >
√
49α21 + 96t1t2 − 7α1
6
≡ α˜2
As f is concave downward,
˜
α2 < 0 < α˜2, α¯2 > 0, f(α¯2) < 0, we conclude that
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f(α2) < 0, ∀α2 > α¯2 and, consequently, ∂C˜S
b
∂p2
∣∣∣
p2=pNb2
> 0.
Let p2 be the (global) minimum of C˜S
b
. We have shown that pNb2 > p2 and know that
pc2b2 (δ) < p
Nb
2 (Proposition 6). Let us now compare p
c2b
2 (δ) to p2. As, for α2 > α¯2,
pc2b2 (δ) is decreasing in δ (see the proof of Proposition 6), it suffices to compare
pm2b2 = p
c2b
2 (δ
m2b), where δm2b is given in (61) and p2:
pm2b2 > p2 ⇔ k1 >
2t1t2 − 2α1α2 − α22
α2
.
Simple algebra allows us to show that Assumption 4ii ensures that this condition is
satisfied (for α2 > α¯2).
As a result, pc2b2 (δ) is at the increasing branch of C˜S
b
. Combining this with the
fact that pc2b2 (δ) < p
Nb
2 , we conclude that total consumer surplus is lower when
platforms collude over the price to charge on the single-homing side than under Nash
competition, if α2 > α¯2.

Proof of Proposition 8.
From (31), if platforms set price p1 on side 1, the price on side 2 is p2 = h(p1). Replacing
p2 = h(p1) in (21), we find that, for a given p1, the platforms’ individual profit is:
piibc1(p1) = pi
ib (p1, h(p1), p1, h(p1)) =
1
2t1
(
t1t2 − α1α2 + 2k1p1 − 2p21
)
. (65)
Suppose, without loss of generality, that platform A unilaterally deviates from the collusive
agreement, by choosing prices, p˜1 and p˜2, that maximize its individual profit while the rival
is charging p1 and p2 = h(p1):
max
p˜1,p˜2
piAb (p˜1, p˜2, p1, h(p1)) .
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Solving the corresponding FOCs, we get the deviation prices (for a given p1):
42
pdc1b1 (p1) =
2(t1t2 − α1α2)(2k1 + α1 − α2)
Ω
− (α1 − α2)
2
Ω
p1
pdc1b2 (p1) =
(t1t2 − α1α2) [Ω− (α1 + α2)(2k1 + α1 − α2)]
t1Ω
− (α1 − α2) [Ω− (α1 − α2)(α1 + α2)]
2t1Ω
p1,
Replacing these prices in piAb (p˜1, p˜2, p1, h(p1)), we get the unilateral deviation profit (for a
given p1):
pidc1b(p1) =
1
t1Ω
{
2(t1t2 − α1α2)
[
k1
2 + k1(α1 − α2) + 2(t1t2 − α1α2)
]
− (α1 − α2) [k1(α1 − α2) + 4(t1t2 − α1α2)] p1 + (α1 − α2)2p21
}
. (66)
1. (Perfect collusion) Consider first the case wherein platforms’ discount is so high
that the ICC is not binding. Then, platforms set p1 that maximises their joint profit
(antecipating that the price on side 2 will be p2 = h(p1)). More precisely, platforms will
choose p1 that maximises (65). Solving the corresponding FOCs, we obtain:
pm1b1 = p
Nb
1 −
α1 − α2
4
.
As a result:
pm1b1 > p
Nb
1 ⇔ α1 < α2. (67)
and:
pm1b2 = h(p
m1b
1 ) = p
Nb
2 +
α1(α1 − α2)
4t1
.
Hence:
pm1b2 > p
Nb
2 ⇔ (α1 > 0 ∧ α1 > α2) ∨ (α1 < 0 ∧ α1 < α2) (68)
Replacing p1 = p
m1b
1 in (65), we obtain the perfect collusive profit:
pim1b = piNb +
(α1 − α2)2
16t1
,
which, as expected, always exceeds the two-sided competition profit.
To get the expression for the critical discount factor, δm1b, it is only missing to derive the
42The expression for Ω in given by (18).
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expression for the deviation profit. Replacing p1 = p
m1b
1 in (66), we get:
pidm1b =
k21Ω + 16(t1t2 − α1α2)2
4t1Ω
Thus, the critical discount factor is:
δm1b =
pidm1b − pim1b
pidm1b − piNb = 1−
Ω
8(t1t2 − α1α2) + Ω .
2. (Imperfect collusion) Consider now that platforms are not sufficiently patient so
that the ICC is binding, i.e., δ < δm1b. For a given p1, the expressions for profits under
collusion, deviation and competition are respectively given in (65), (66) and Proposition
4. Replacing them in the ICC (in equality) and solving it with respect to p1, we obtain
(beyond the trivial solution p1 = p
Nb
1 ):
pc1b1 (δ) = p
Nb
1 −
(α1 − α2)Ωδ
2 [(1− δ)(α1 − α2)2 + Ω] (69)
The corresponding price on side 2 is:
pc1b2 (δ) = h(p
c1b
1 (δ)) = p
Nb
2 +
α1(α1 − α2)Ωδ
2t1 [(1− δ)(α1 − α2)2 + Ω] . (70)
It follows immediately that the conditions to have supra-competitive prices on each side
of the market are exactly the same as those obtained for the case of perfect collusion, (67)
and (68).
Finally, replacing p1 = p
c1b
1 in (65), we obtain the most sustainable collusive profit for a
given δ < δm1b when platforms only collude on the multi-homing side:
pic1b(δ) = piNb +
2Ω(α1 − α2)2(t1t2 − α1α2)δ(1− δ)
t1 [(1− δ)(α1 − α2)2 + Ω]2
.

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